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ABSTRACT
With trade taking place continuously  on a daily  basis,  its  often-reported success
gives the impression that all participants involved are to a certain extent somewhat
successful too. This dissertation draws attention to the discrepancies that have often
gone unnoticed throughout the decades and the effects that have arisen as a result.
South  Africa’s  (SA)  and  the  United  States  of  America’s  (US)  trade  relationship
through the African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA) is the focus of this study,
with this relationship being analysed from as far back as history has been recorded
to the modern day.
Least developed countries (LDCs) are an integral part of this study because most
trade-related activities involve them, and they contain most of the world’s natural
resources, but most importantly they also make up a large portion of the world’s
population.  It's  baffling to  see that  where these factors  are present,  there's  also
inequality.  Seemingly,  there  are  efforts  that  deal  specifically  with  the  challenges
faced  by  developing  countries,  but  what  is  concerning  is  these  solutions  are
formulated by developed countries which created them and continue to perpetuate
them.
The approach adopted was mostly  that  of  contrasting events  that  have involved
trade  over  the  decades  and  a  discussion  of  how  these  events  have  shaped
international, political and trade relations, that is, the existing status quo. Examples
include  the  two  World  Wars;  oppressive  regimes  such  as  apartheid;  and  the
formation  of  global  institutions  ranging from the  International  Trade  Organization
(ITO) to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), and the World Trade
Organization (WTO).
The first three chapters contain an introduction, a background focus on development
and the history of relations between South Africa and the United States of America.
The  last  two  chapters  contain  a  discussion  on  AGOA  as  well  as  findings  and
recommendations  that  can  be  implemented  to  assist  with  this  issue.  What  this
dissertation was aiming to  establish was the perpetual  involvement of  developed
countries  in  the  affairs  of  developing  countries.  This  is  illustrated  through  the
renegotiation of the AGOA in 2015, where SA had to accept ultimatums set for it by
the US.
This dissertation further shows that such tactics are nothing new when the US is
involved, as is evidenced by its involvement in major global events that have shaped
the  course  of  history.  This  approach  is  not  only  harmful  but  also  stagnates
development, as developing countries must adhere to agreements that sometimes
are not to their benefit. The findings indicate a contradictory pattern: when solutions
to challenges faced by developing countries are presented, they translate instead
into a further stronghold over developing countries because of past atrocities such as
colonisation and apartheid.
vii
What appears throughout the dissertation are the ever-present structures that are
intended to perform functions supposed to be for the improved good of developing
countries, but which result in those countries facing never-ending challenges, some
of  which  are  self-inflicted  through  alliances  such  as  the  AGOA  with  developed
countries.
Key words:
South Africa (SA); United States of America (US or USA); AGOA; development; least
developed countries (LDCs); trade; trade relations; apartheid; dumping; WTO; 
developing countries; developed countries
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CHAPTER ONE: 
INTRODUCTION/RESEARCH PROPOSAL
1.1 Background
The AGOA is legislation enacted by the United States (US) Government with the
intention of allowing access to its markets for African countries that are members of
the agreement.  Initially enacted from May 2000 up until  September 2015, it  was
recently up for renegotiation and reauthorisation for a further 10-year period until
September  2025.1 The introduction  to  the  Preamble  of  the  Act  enacted  in  2000
states that the parties to this agreement are sub-Saharan African (SSA) countries as
well as those in the Caribbean Basin.2 The focus of AGOA is to authorise a new
trade investment policy for the former and to expand trade benefits for the latter.3 
With the recent anti-dumping duty disagreement regarding poultry products imported
from the US, several authors4 argue that the terms of the renewed agreement are
not beneficial to the South African poultry industry.5 The US put SA into a position
where it had to lower trade barriers to continue being a part of the AGOA agreement.
This resulted in the dumping of 65 000 tonnes of tariff-free bone-in chicken. Taking
into consideration that SA was somewhat pressurised into accepting this agreement
and allowing the importation of poultry which was considered by the South African
Poultry Association (SAPA)6 as being dumped into the Southern African Customs
Union (SACU) market,7 to what extent can such influence be wielded by a single
country,  and  what  does  that  entail  for  the  development  prospects  of  a  country
involved in such a scenario?
Therefore, this research proposal is aimed at studying the effect that lowering trade
barriers has had on SA’s trade relationship with the US, with the focus being on the
extent to which South African development has been affected.8 This study raises the
question of whether the change in the trade terms between the respective countries
could be an indicator of the actual trade relationship. The perception held and often
1 E Naumann ‘An overview of AGOA’s performance, beneficiaries, renewal provisions and the status 
of South Africa’ (2015) Stellenbosch: tralac. 23.
2 The African Growth and Opportunity Act of the 106th Congress of the United States of America, 
2000 251.
3 Ibid.
4 W Gumede ‘Strict AGOA rules put African policies and trade on the line' African Independent, 
Tuesday, 19 September 2017. Available at https://agoa.info/news/article/15265-strict-agoa-rules-put-
african-policies-and-trade-on-the-line-columnist.html, accessed on 20 February 2018; Naumann note 
1 23.; C Prinsloo ‘AGOA and the future of US-Africa relations’ South Africa Institute of International 
Affairs 1 Available at http://www.saiia.org.za, accessed on 16 October 2018; A Carroll ‘Forging a New 
Era in US-South African Relations’ Atlantic Council Africa Center (2017) 14.
5 Gumede note 4.
6 The SAPA deals with tariffs, agricultural trade policy, food safety issues, monitoring of developments
in the industry and any matter the poultry industry wishes to address collectively. 
7 O Oluyeju and M Mafu ‘The African Growth and Opportunity Act: A Poisoned Chalice Handed to 
South Africa?’ (2016) South African Yearbook of International Law 47.
8 T Bolton ‘The state of the South African poultry industry’ Supermarket & Retailer (2015) 17.
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portrayed is that there is an equal standing when negotiations take place. Events
such as the poultry dispute suggest otherwise. This has a bearing on the extent to
which a country is able to develop and sustain development. Moreover, development
on its own is a process which is at times a lengthy one. Therefore, the question that
needs to be pondered over is: is AGOA is in fact helping with SA’s development; or
is their concern a tool used to gain control over SA’s markets? These among other
questions  are  what  this  dissertation  intends  on  researching.  Previously  scholars
have explored the affect this agreement has on the trade relationship between the
US and SA. The stance taken by the US to leverage SA into agreeing to lower safety
standards to remain a part of the agreement shows the power it holds. Some have
called for  the  AGOA to be reviewed and renegotiated in  totality  to  allow SA an
opportunity to determine how it conducts trade as opposed to being dictated to in
return for trade benefits. In future SA must take stringent measures to avoid entering
into similar agreements if it intends on remaining in control of its major economic
industries and developing in the manner in which it intends to.
The research problem this dissertation intends on posing is investigating the effect
on trade relations between SA and the US in relation to the AGOA. It aims to explore
the historical  context of developed and developing countries’  trade relations, with
specific consideration being given to the provisions of the AGOA, as well as how the
ongoing  trade  relations  between  SA  and  US  affect  development,  using  the
abovementioned examples as points of references from SA and various international
sources.
1.2 Preliminary literature study
The Preamble to the AGOA reads as follows: 
‘An Act: To authorize a new trade and investment policy for sub-Saharan Africa,
expand  trade  benefits  to  the  countries  in  the  Caribbean  Basin,  renew  the
generalized  system  of  preferences,  and  reauthorize  the  trade  adjustment
assistance programs.’9
Further  to  this,  according  to  the  International  Centre  for  Trade  and  Sustainable
Development (ICTSD), the AGOA is a unilateral agreement that provides to eligible
sub-Saharan African countries duty-free and quota-free access to the US market for
close to 6 500 products.10 The two main purposes served by enacting AGOA were to
promote  trade  with  qualifying  African  countries,  which  would  in  turn  see  the
establishment  of  strategic  business  partnerships  within  the  sub-Saharan  African
region.  The Act  also serves to  provide duty-free market  access for  exports  from
9 The African Growth and Opportunity Act, 2000 note 2. 
10 International Centre for Trade and Sustainable Development (ICTSD). Trump decides to suspend 
trade preferences for clothing products from Rwanda. Available at https://www.ictsd.org/bridges-
news/bridges-africa/news/trump-decides-to-suspend-trade-preferences-for-clothing-products, 
accessed on 11 April 2018.
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African partner countries.11 The definition of AGOA provided for in the Act is different
from how the US in a variety of instances has conducted its trade operations – its
conduct has been contrary to what this definition suggests. The primary examples
are SA and more recently Rwanda.12 South African authors13 share the view that SA
should take on more responsibility for its economic emancipation with regard to the
recent  position that  SA was put  in  when it  had to  accept  unfavourable terms to
remain a part of the agreement.14 
SA is integrated firmly into the AGOA and pulling out at any moment during the
renegotiation would have had severe repercussions for the South African economy,
seeing that the Act already generates a considerable amount of the national GDP. In
2014 alone, the value of exports SA sent to the USA amounted to US$8 billion, and
40 percent of that amount was a result of preferential benefits derived from AGOA.15
Agriculture exports proportionally amounted to US$300 million, of which 75 percent
is AGOA preferential benefits.16
Benefits are conferred on member countries of this Act:
‘In 2015, South Africa was under immense pressure to meet the US’ conditions
or lose out on the preferential trade benefits offered by the AGOA.’17 
These  benefits  can  be  withdrawn  by  the  US  government  if  members  conduct
themselves contrary to the provisions provided for in AGOA. One of these is the
eligibility for duty-free treatment for all agricultural goods under the AGOA.18 Other
considerations under the Act are the position with regard to non-economic issues,
that certain benefits are also suspended if they are in contravention of basic human
rights and founding democratic principles, which are mutually beneficial to all parties
concerned.19 Section 103 of the Act has a statement policy which states that: 
‘Congress  supports  negotiating  reciprocal  and  mutually  beneficial  trade
agreements, including the possibility of establishing free trade areas (FTAs) that
serve the interests of both the USA and SSA.’20
11 BC Mbenyane The role of business and government in shaping South Africa's food safety regime 
between 2000 and 2015 (published LLM thesis) (2016) University of the Witswatersrand 55.
12 Rwanda was threatened that it would lose its trade benefits by President Trump unless it complied 
with the Act. 
13 Naumann note 1; Prinsloo note 4.
14 Naumann ibid 28.
15 SAIIA: South Africa and AGOA: What is at stake? http://www.saiia.org.za/opinion-analysis/south-
africa-and-agoa-what-is-at-stake, accessed on 11 April 2018.
16 Ibid. 
17 Mbenyane note 11 57.
18 International Centre for Trade and Sustainable Development (ICTSD). South Africa at risk of losing 
AGOA agriculture benefits over poultry row. Available at 
https://www.ictsd.org/bridges-news/bridges-africa/news/south-africa-at-risk-of-losing-agoa-agriculture-
benefits-over, accessed on 11 April 2018.
19 The African Growth and Opportunity Act, 2000 note 2 s 104.
20 Ibid., note 2.
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The  holding  up  of  the  renewal  of  AGOA  legislation  agreement  was  a  second
development that was deemed the ‘elephant in the room’ – this was SA’s status
under a future AGOA arrangement.  The argument which arose from members of
Congress is that SA was not lowering barriers enough for the US to have access to
its  markets.  This  lengthened  negotiations  and  led  to  then  US President  Barack
Obama threatening to retract benefits derived under AGOA if the deal which was on
offer  at  that  point  in  negotiations  was  not  accepted.  However,  SA’s  renewed
inclusion in the Act was announced in March 2015, which left SA and the US with
less than a year to reach an agreement that would activate SA's formal inclusion in
the agreement.21 Naumann22 wrote about the updated renewal terms contained in the
new agreement ending September 2025, as follows: 
‘The new deal contained a new term to expiry, a restructuring of the percentages
regarding the rules of origin in relation to apparel materials, updated legislations
on monitoring and reviewing, the promotion of the role of women in social and
economic  development,  AGOA  utilisation  strategies,  agricultural  assistance
provisions and a host of other interventions and expressions of US trade policy
objectives.’
With this renewed inclusion, Prinsloo noted a few arbitrary requirements that are
included as a part of the Act. He notes that these demonstrate the position taken by
the US and what the outlook going forward translates to for other members:
‘Considering that the US offers trade preferences under AGOA to sub-Saharan
African  countries  unilaterally,  without  any  specific  negotiated  preferences  in
return, the leveraging of AGOA in this manner came as a surprise. It also raises
the  possibility  of  the  US  leveraging  AGOA  in  a  similar  manner  for  other
perceived trade barriers that the US private sector has complained about.’23 
Prinsloo  further  states  that  the  only  alternative  to  continued  subjugation  in  this
manner is the formulation of a new trade agreement, perhaps post-2025, like the
Trade,  Development  and  Cooperation  Agreement  (TDCA)  between  SA  and  the
European Union where there is room to negotiate terms.24
Naumann observed that other restrictions that the US deemed unacceptable were
around foreign ownership and investment in the private security industry. Another
concern was a proposed overhaul of South Africa’s intellectual property (IP) laws. 25
Whether the US will take a similar approach to address these issues is unknown as
21 Mbenyane note 11 56.
22 Naumann note 1 24.
23 SAIIA note 15.
24 Ibid.
25 Naumann note 1 24.
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yet since because they have not raised them as points of concern. Gumede26 notes
that  the  US  uses  its  position  to  dictate  to  other  member  nations  how  trade
agreements  are  to  be  drafted  and  implemented  as  can  be  seen  with  the  US’
provision which provides it with the ability to review country eligibility as it wishes.
Further, the countries in this position are unable to challenge with threats of backlash
from influential allies that could result in sanctions for dissenting nations. As a result
of  this,  sub-Saharan  countries  are  unable  to  develop  their  trade  industries  in  a
manner which is beneficial to them. 
Another  example  of  the  dictating  terms of  the  US can  be  seen  with  the  recent
suspension of trade preferences for Rwanda by the US owing to their raising of trade
barriers to limit the import of second-hand clothing to strengthen their markets. The
US President, Donald Trump, decided in the final week of March 2018 to suspend
duty-free treatment on US imports of apparel products from Rwanda under AGOA.27
The sanction,  which was set  to  take effect  in  early  June 2018,  was imposed in
reaction  to  the  East  African  country’s  decision  to  raise  tariffs  on  second-hand
clothing with a view to phasing out imports and encouraging the development of local
manufacturing capacity in the clothing sector.28
On the other hand, similarly, Carroll’s point of view offers a different approach to the
trade relations between SA and the US. He is already looking beyond the recently
reauthorized and renegotiated agreement. His view is that the political landscape in
SA has a potentially immense task ahead of itself to maintain healthy relations post-
2025 when the current agreement expires. He states that the US should maintain a
healthy relationship with SA as it is the gateway through which it can present itself as
a viable trade partner for other African states. SA is viewed as a leader within the
African continent and success with it will encourage other states to follow suit and
potentially trade with the US. Hence, the position taken by the US with AGOA may
potentially harm its ambitions in the long run. His reasons for his assertions are:
‘South Africa has used the trade preferences provided by AGOA more effectively
than any other nation – its exports to the United States have steadily increased
over  the  years  and  it  is  increasingly  becoming  a  market  for  US goods  and
services. Notably, US-South African relations have always been complex. During
the apartheid era, the United States was viewed with antipathy in equal measure
by the national government, domestic opposition, and the ANC.’29
Mbenyane30 goes on to say: 
26 Gumede note 4.
27 International Centre for Trade and Sustainable Development (ICTSD). Trump decides to suspend 
trade preferences for clothing products from Rwanda. Available at https://www.ictsd.org/bridges-
news/bridges-africa/news/trump-decides-to-suspend-trade-preferences-for-clothing-products, 
accessed on 11 April 2018.
28 Ibid.
29 Carroll note 4.
30 Mbenyane note 11 13.
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‘The  AGOA  Poultry  Trade  Debacle  is  the  most  significant  and  most  recent
combined effort by the South African government and the private food industry to
collaborate in an extended economic and diplomatic battle between South Africa
and the United States of America.’
An interesting view regarding multilateral trading systems and trade policies involving
developed and developing nations is one taken by Van Grasstek in his book titled
The History and the Future of the World Trade Organization.31 He quotes Hamid
Mamdouh, a diplomat to the WTO from Egypt in 1989, as follows: 
‘Developing nations face a strong temptation to dance with the devil (the major
players) and succumb to their divide-and-rule tactics; and reaping the potential
benefits of doing so is generally uppermost on their agendas. One of the main
bargaining chips they can offer in this process is the influence they can exert on
other developing countries, particularly through regional and other groupings.’32
This can be said to be the case involving the US and SA. It appears to have become
the norm that such a stance is taken when parties sit around a negotiating table.
Such a scenario is presented to onlookers as a democratic process, the form of
governance favoured by the West, with it eventually becoming the status quo. This in
turn leaves SA in a precarious position that gradually erodes its ability to determine
the path it intends to follow to achieve its objectives. With AGOA, a demonstration of
what could possibly happen in future is being illustrated, therefore putting SA in an
unfavourable  position.  If  this  becomes  the  norm  from  here  onwards,  recent
developments suggest an eerie dawn going forward.
1.3 Research problems and objectives
The key questions that will  support this research will  take a historical look at the
trade relationship between South Africa and the United States.
 To what extent has development been a key focus in the trade relationship
between developed and developing countries?
 What were the trade dynamics during the apartheid regime between South
Africa and the United States and to what extent the USA accommodate the
governmental change post-1994?
 How does the implementation of AGOA– referring to specific cases and
events – affect the current trade relations status quo between South Africa
and the USA?
1.4 Principal theories 
31 C van Grasstek The History and Future of the World Trade Organization (2013) 97.
32 Ibid.
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The following theories are what modern trade is based on.  The world is moving
towards globalisation which interlinks operations the world over. These theories have
been used to explain the various operation of trade as developed and also been
affected  /integrated  by  seamlessly  with  technology.  Looking  forward,  there  is
promise of increased growth for developing countries, however, the rate is a concern
as we continue seeing the west dominating all  aspects of events and developing
nations only coming after to innovation. This leads to the position in which we found
ourselves in under AGOA.
1.4.1 Comparative Advantage Theory
Comparative  advantage  in  an  international  trade  context  involves  a  country
specializing in producing and exporting goods in which its comparative advantage is
greatest, or its comparative disadvantage is the least, and it should import goods in
which its comparative disadvantage is the most.33 In layman’s terms,  this means
understanding  what  you  are  good  at  and  being  able  to  produce  this  to  your
advantage, whether it is a service, product or newly developed format of trade done
virtually through the Internet using online shopping, applications, and the like.34 This
theory was written about by David Ricardo in his book  The Principles of Political
Economy, which was published in 1817.35 What he wrote is still applicable today in
the form of conventional international trade theory.36  
The  relevance  of  this  theory  to  my  study  is  that  the  reason  AGOA  came  into
existence could be based on this theory, the reasoning being that trade between the
US and developing countries is not for the purpose of granting market access only
but for trading in products and services that the other is lacking in.37 This is what the
comparative advantage theory is based on.38 can also be seen as an ideological
foundation of the World Trade Organization (WTO).39
1.4.2 Development Theory
Development is a widely mooted term used mostly in relation to developing countries
as a  term to illustrate  the  distance that  mostly  non-European and non-American
countries seemingly ought to cover prior to achieving first-world status. Looking from
a bird’s-eye view, this is not a pattern which a disadvantaged party would be pleased
with. With wars, famine, plagues and global catastrophes not in minimal numbers,
although  there  has  been  a  lot  of  progress,  the  approach  to  how  innovation  is
distributed is never horizontal. With the majority of the world living in a hierarchical
33 MJ Trebilcock & R Howse The regulation of international trade 3rd ed (2005) 4.
34 MJ Trebilcock, R Howse & A Elison The regulation of international trade 4th ed (2013).
35 D Ricardo, The Principles of Political Economy (1817)
36 Trebilcock & Howse note 33 3.
37 BR Williams ‘African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA): Background and Reauthorization’ 
Congressional Research Service (2014) 1.
38 Trebilcock & Howse note 33 3.
39 D Collins The World Trade Organization: A beginner’s guide (2015) 3.
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structure, the benefits seemingly flow in this manner as well which sees them trickle
down only to a certain point.
At this rate, development will undoubtedly occur when the authorities allow it to. This
is not a good omen, with the promises of prosperity and a better brighter future for all
being a promised land that is seemingly never reached and a sunset that is slowly
edging nearer by the second. These theories link to the study in that conclusions can
be drawn as to where such a relationship is derived from.  
The development theory is relevant to my study because it is a crucial aspect that
developing countries have been championing for since the creation of the General
Agreement on Trade and Tariffs (GATT). It has been an important consideration as a
dispute  settlement  mechanism  came  into  existence  at  that  time.  Developing
countries  have  been  assisted  at  every  turn  to  make  sure  they  can  trade  with
developed countries without losing the important benefits of trade. The WTO has
therefore created mechanisms such as the Committee on Trade and Development
(CTD)40, as well as Aid for Trade41 provisions, among others.
1.5 Research methodology
This  research will  be  desktop based and will  make use of  primary  sources that
include the AGOA, WTO Agreements and other  official  documents.  Furthermore,
published  material  or  secondary  sources  such  as  journal  articles,  textbooks,
legislation, trade briefs and other online sources will also be used. 
Among methods that will be assisting the researcher are critically reading material
and thereafter analysing with the intention of comparing, differentiating and finding
contrasting views on the AGOA and the development of LDCs and trade relations. 
40 The Committee on Trade and Development (CTD) serves as a focal point for the consideration and 
coordination of work on development in the WTO.
41 Aid for Trade helps developing countries, and particularly least developed countries, trade by 
assisting them with overcoming a range of supply-side and trade-related infrastructure obstacles 
which constrains their ability to engage in international trade.
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1.6 Dissertation structure
The following headings will form chapters in this thesis/dissertation:
Chapter One – INTRODUCTION/RESEARCH PROPOSAL: This a brief introduction
to the topic, including the background and the rationale for the study. It provides the
underlying reasons for choosing this topic. 
Chapter Two – DEVELOPMENT IN THE MULTILATERAL TRADING SYSTEM: This
chapter will provide an overview of the trading relationship between developed and
developing countries within the multilateral trading system to ascertain the extent to
which development has been a key focus in the multilateral trading system. 
Chapter  Three  –  OVERVIEW  OF  THE  TRADE  AND  POLITICAL  RELATIONS
BETWEEN  SOUTH  AFRICA  AND  THE  UNITED  STATES  OF  AMERICA:  This
chapter will provide an overview of the trade relationship between South Africa and
the United States of America. Further, the chapter will focus on the dynamics in the
trade relations between these countries during the apartheid regime and how the US
adjusted to SA’s position after 1994.
Chapter Four – THE AGOA AND THE OVERALL IMPLICATIONS IN RELATION TO
AFRICAN  COUNTRIES  –  This  chapter  will  discuss  the  extent  to  which  AGOA
implementation has affected the relationship between the countries by referring to
specific cases and events. 
Chapter  Five  –  RECOMMENDATIONS  AND  CONCLUSION:  This  chapter  will
provide  an  overview  of  the  main  research  questions  and  submit  relevant
recommendations. 
1.7  Conclusion 
Therefore, overall, this study is going to be enquiring about the effects of Western
influence on developmental aspects of African countries, particularly the relationship
between SA and the US through AGOA. The intention of  the AGOA is  to  grant
market  access  for  SSA  countries  to  the  US  which  in  return  grants  benefits  to
selected products and goods. With the reauthorisation in 2015, some of SA’s authors
agreed that in future there ought to be a more reciprocal function in this agreement in
order to avoid the dictates that were made by the US taking in place in future. The
AGOA already confers significant power to the US and this has the opposite effect
on the long-term development of African countries. Such tactics can easily be used
again in future and become the status quo.
In chapter 2 a discussion on Development in the Multilateral Trading System follows.
Included are the history of the ITO, GATT and the WTO and how they incorporated
development  into  their  functions.  The  African  Union  and  Agenda  2063  are  also
discussed, where a vision Africa has for itself is expanded on. Thereafter, prior to the
conclusion, there is a discussion on development and how it affects trade.
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CHAPTER TWO: 
DEVELOPMENT IN THE MULTILATERAL TRADING SYSTEM
2.1 Introduction
As briefly mentioned in chapter 1, the African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA)
agreement is a unilateral  trade agreement between the United States of America
(US) and mainly sub-Saharan African (SSA) countries, among others. As such, the
Act confers benefits on members in exchange for market access granted by the US
as a trade arrangement that encourages business relations between the US and
these countries. This dissertation aims to discuss how truly beneficial this agreement
has  been,  especially  in  the  context  of  Africa’s  developing  and  least  developed
countries.
In order to answer this question, the chapter will have to elaborate on the meaning
and relevance of development. Development has undoubtedly been a widespread
issue affecting the entire world. It is regularly mentioned in different contexts under
various disciplines as a result of its open-ended interpretation. In most cases you
would find that it is usual to refer to the circumstances and situations surrounding
developing countries. This can be interpreted in many different ways and what can
be drawn from this is that it suggests that the world can be in a better position than it
currently is. Therefore, more can and should be done.
Usually in cases involving development there is an intended goal that is a target to
be reached, which can happen incrementally over a period of time. Looking at it from
an  individual  perspective,  it  can  often  seem  jarring  when  intending  to  effect
development on a global scale because of the various factors involved. The focus of
this chapter is to discuss the extent that development has influenced negotiations
and the overall  functioning of the multilateral  trade system (MTS),  with particular
focus on the position of African countries that form part of sub-Saharan Africa (SSA).
Further,  this chapter will  provide an overview of the trading relationship between
developed and developing countries within the MTS, which will be done through a
discussion on the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) and the World
Trade Organization (WTO). 
2.2 A brief background
During  the  early  1900s,  a  series  of  events,  which  will  be  elaborated  on  in  the
chapter,  contributed  to  delayed  development  of  the  trading  system.  The  role  of
developing countries in the evolution of  the MTS, from prior  to,  during and after
GATT 1947 to the conclusion of the Uruguay Round of multilateral trade negotiation
and the establishment of the WTO was interrupted by the First World War.42 This
among other global catastrophic events, and ended the process of global integration
42 TN Srinivasan & SC Park Jr. ‘Developing countries in the world trading system: From GATT, 1947 
to the third ministerial meeting of WTO, 1999’ 4.
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that had been going on from the second half of the nineteenth century.43 Around the
1930s and 1940s, events such as the Great Depression (1929-1939), World War II
(WW  II)  (1  September  1939  to  2  September  1945),  and  the  involvement  of
developed countries in these events indirectly caused a delay in the development of
developing  countries.44 Subsequently,  after  the  end of  this  dark  period,  attempts
were made in order to propel the world into not only rebuilding the structures that
had been destroyed as a result of these events, but also to ensure that a repeat of
the  wars  would  be unnecessary.  During  the  subsistence of  WW II,  the  US was
engaged in discussions with the United Kingdom (UK) concerning the problems and
possible  solutions  regarding  the  post-war  economic  order.45 This  period  saw the
creation of institutions such as the United Nations (UN), which officially came into
existence on 24 October 1945 and replaced the ineffective League of Nations, 46 and
the formulation of agreements of negotiation such as the GATT which was formerly
intended to be the International Trade Organization (ITO) and is nowadays known as
the  WTO.  The  US  government  representatives  met  several  times  with
representatives  of  other  major  nations  to  design  a  post-war  international  trading
system that would parallel the international monetary system.47 The primary purpose
of these meetings was first to draft a charter for the ITO and second to negotiate the
substance  of  an  ITO  agreement  consisting  specifically  of  rules  governing
international trade and reductions in tariffs.48 
2.2.1 The International Trade Organization (ITO)
This charter was to be called the Havana Charter but it never came into existence
because it was not ratified as domestic opposition to the Truman Administration in
the US led to efforts to obtain congressional backing for the ITO being abandoned
towards  the  end  of  the  year  1950.49 Despite  its  being  successfully  negotiated
between the countries present, the British were unenthusiastic about the proposal
and the US felt the outcome was mixed in relation to its interests.50 For example, the
charter had provisions that insisted that foreign investments should be expropriated
or nationalised only under ‘just’, ‘reasonable’, or ‘appropriate’ conditions, which the
US saw as weakening of the protection of its investments abroad, where the US had
previously enjoyed considerable success.51 From the US point of view, agreements
made about stabilising commodity prices were inconsistent with the other provisions
43 Ibid.
44 CP Bown Self-enforcing trade: Developing countries and WTO dispute settlement (2009) 11. 
45 Van Grasstek note 31 43.
46 The League of Nations was an international diplomatic group developed after World War I as a way 
of solving disputes between countries before they erupted into open warfare. It was a precursor to the 
United Nations. Available at https://www.history.com/topics/world-war-i/league-of-nations, accessed 
on 12 November 2018.
47 Crowley note 47 43.
48 Ibid.
49 R Toye ‘The International Trade Organization’ in The Oxford Handbook on the World Trade 
Organization (2012) 85.
50 Toye note 49 93.
51 Ibid. 96.
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of  the  charter;  but  there  was  a  belief  that  this  would  be  alleviated  by  primary
producing countries entering into them.52 There was also a belief that it would be
beneficial to lay down ‘rules of the road’ to eliminate the worst characteristics of such
agreements. These provisions became the subject of intense scrutiny and criticism
within the US even though 53 countries – including Britain – had already signed it.53
All these factors contributed to the result of ratification being delayed, which saw
other countries that looked to the US for direction as the de facto leader of the free
world also holding back in order to see which position the US would take.54 This was
partly due to the US holding indisputable power during ITO negotiations, where it
controlled as much as three-quarters of the world’s monetary gold and accounted for
one-third of global exports while only importing only one-tenth.55
During testimonials in front of the Senate, Will Clayton – who was the chairman of
the US delegation – argued that  the exchange controls,  their  import  quotas and
further restrictions were anticipated to disappear under the ITO because of the world
recovering  economically.56 However,  protectionists  were  of  the  opinion  that
intervention by states in foreign trade matters was unacceptable, but believed that an
International Trade Organization would be an incipient ‘super state’ that eventually
would infringe on the national sovereignty of the US.57 This attachment that countries
had to their sovereignty was one which they were not willing to surrender easily. 58
For instance, the National Association of Manufacturers59 supported free trade but
opposed the charter even though they felt that there was a need for an organisation
of some sort; they felt that plans drawn up at that time would be more harmful than
beneficial.60 
On the other hand, Clair Wilcox, a US negotiator in the ITO charter discussions,
attempted to paint a positive picture to non-governmental advisors that the charter
would not hamper any operations the US had undergone and wished to undertake in
future.61 Although this had the potential to be persuasive to a domestic audience in
the US, third world countries in Latin America were waiting to see how the US would
act. The US ratifying the charter would have made it seem as if the US believed they
would get a good deal – which they did not.62 Therefore, it  can be said that the
52 Ibid.
53 Ibid.
54 I Trofimov ‘The failure of the International Trade Organization (ITO): A policy entrepreneurship 
perspective’ (2012) 5(1) Journal of Politics and Law 57.
55 J Scott ‘Developing countries in the ITO and GATT negotiations’ Brooks World Poverty Institute 
Working Paper 95 (2009) 4.
56 Toye note 49 97.
57 Trofimov note 54 57.
58 Van Grasstek note 31 10.
59 The National Association of Manufacturers (NAM) is the largest manufacturing association in the 
United States, representing small and large manufacturers in every industrial sector and in all 50 
states. Available at http://www.nam.org/About/, accessed on 12 November 2018.
60 D Drache ‘The short but significant life of the International Trade Organization: Lessons for our time’
Coventry: University of Warwick. Centre for the Study of Globalisation and Regionalisation Working 
Papers (2000) 3. 
61 Toye note 49 85.
62 Ibid. 98.
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international  game the Truman administration had to play hampered its domestic
efforts to secure ratification. In 1948 Truman had requested that Congress enact a
resolution  to  approve  the  charter  which  he  later  withdrew  after  two  years  of
legislative  inaction.63 What  eventually  sealed  the  fate  of  the  charter  was
congressional occupation with the Cold War in Korea, which saw the announcement
made in December of that year that the US would not be ratifying the ITO charter.64 
2.2.2 The General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT)
Instead, the formulation of GATT was the result of these meetings and although the
attempts to create the ITO failed, they were significant for the effort to establish the
GATT which in turn led to the eventual creation of the WTO.65 The GATT came into
being after the first attempt at creating the ITO as a body to perform the function of
regulating international trade among the world’s countries had not been successful.66
The  concept  of  the  GATT  had  initially  originated  from  the  Bretton  Woods
Conference67 at  the end of  World  War II.68 This  is  where a gathering of  finance
ministers  from  the  Allied  Nations69 discussed  the  failings  of  the  World  War  I
Versailles Treaty70.  What also took place was discussions about the possibility of
creating a new international monetary system and whose aim would be to support
post-war reconstruction, peace and economic stability.71 This is where two of the
modern  world’s  premier  financial  institutions  were  created:  the  International
Monetary  Fund  (IMF)  and  the  International  Bank  for  Reconstruction  and
Development  (the  World  Bank),  which  formed  part  of  the  Bretton  Woods
Institutions.72 
After  the  war,  23  countries  led  by  the  US,  Canada  and  the  UK negotiated  the
GATT.73 Their goal  was the formulation of an agreement that would stabilise the
world after the war and avoid repeating the mistakes which led to its breakout.74
GATT 1947 was created by a round table consisting of the world’s countries that
were looking to devise plans on the regulation of trade. 75 GATT was the initial step
63 Van Grasstek note 31 44.
64 Toye note 49 98.
65 Ibid. 85.
66 Bown note 44 15.
67 The Bretton Woods Conference (July 1944) created the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the 
World Bank.
68 Crowley note 47 42.
69 The Allied Nations were the countries that together opposed the Axis powers during World War 
II (1939–1945).
70 The World War I Versailles Treaty was the most important of the peace treaties that brought World 
War I to an end. The Treaty ended the state of war between Germany and the Allied Powers.
71 Crowley note 47 42.
72 The Bretton Woods Institutions are the World Bank, and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and 
were set up at a meeting of 43 countries in Bretton Woods, New Hampshire, USA in July 1944. Their 
aims were to help rebuild the shattered post-war economy and to promote international economic 
cooperation.
73 Crowley note 47 11.
74 Ibid. 11.
75 Van Grasstek note 31 7.
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in  negotiations  for  cutting  tariffs  that  would  translate  throughout  subsequent
negotiations leading to the formulation of various agreements.76 The GATT did not
create a formal institution, instead a small  GATT Secretariat  consisting of limited
institutional  apparatus  and  was  headquartered  in  Geneva  to  administer  the
problems,  issues  and  complaints  that  arose  among  members.77 GATT  was  a
multilateral trade agreement with the authority to regulate the trade regulations of its
member  governments  as  an  international  treaty.78 It  had  no  authority  over
individuals, private firms, or public corporations and it governed the interactions of
countries that voluntarily agreed to abide by its rules.79 During the majority of the
1900s the GATT was on an international scale the main multilateral forum for tariff
reduction  negotiation  and  tariff-related  issues.80 The  reduction  of  tariffs  among
member nations was evident as early as 1952.81 
(a) Rounds
Throughout the period from 1947 to 1961, GATT’s development involved the first five
rounds where additions were made to fill in areas left open by the ITO’s failure to
come  into  existence.82 These  negotiating  rounds  were  held  in  Geneva  (1947),
Torquay (1951), Geneva (1956) again and Dillon (1960-61).83 The additions were
addressed through rounds which included the Kennedy Round (1964-67), the Tokyo
Round (1973-79) and the Uruguay Round (1986-1994).84 Under these negotiation
stages,  various  approaches  were  taken  to  address  certain  trade-related  issues
among developing and developed countries. Each round had its unique distinction
and objective, even if some never materialised, for instance the Annecy Round of
1949 and the Torquay round of 1951 expanded GATT membership but with minimal
progress in reducing tariffs.85 
(i) Geneva and Kennedy rounds
The initial  round  for  GATT negotiations  was  called  the  Geneva  Round  of  1947,
where the original rules and the 24 founding Articles of the GATT were formulated,
which  resulted  in  the  first  set  of  standards.86 The  fundamental  principle  of  the
agreement referred to as the Most-Favoured-Nation (MFN) Treatment provided for in
Article I of the GATT stated that rights and obligations should apply uniformly to all
76 Bown note 44 15.
77 Crowley note 47 43.
78 Crowley note 47 53.
79 Ibid.
80 Zeiler ‘Expanding the mandate of the GATT: The first seven rounds’ in The Oxford Handbook on 
The World Trade Organization Oxford University Press (2012) 145.
81 Bown note 44 12.
82 Ibid.
83 P Van den Bossche The law and policy of the World Trade Organization: Text, cases and materials 
(2005) 82.
84 Ibid.
85 DA Irwin ‘The GATT in historical perspective’ (1995) 85(2) Historical Perspectives on International 
Institutions 325
86 D Irwin, P Mavroidis & O Sykes The genesis of the GATT C (2008) 5. 
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contracting parties.87 Reciprocity is the principle that is applied in GATT negotiating
rounds, and it operates on the basis that where a country offers to reduce a barrier to
trade,  another  country  ‘reciprocates’  by  offering  to  reduce  one  of  its  own  trade
barriers.88 Article III together with the MFN principle are two of the most important
basic rules of negotiations.89 Arguments put forward by papers written by Bagwell
and  Staiger90 state  that  these  principles  together  work  towards  increasing  the
efficiency of the world trading systems.91 
In Geneva, from May 1964 until June 1967, the Kennedy Round continued with tariff
reductions which began in 1947 after WW II.92 Issues that were focused on involved
eliminating non-tariff barriers, reducing all rates for all products by 50 percent instead
of negotiating for individual items - this included additional agricultural and industrial
products.93 At the end of discussions, participants agreed to reduce rates on most
industrial items by 35 percent over 5 years except for steel and textiles with the US
also reducing its rates for chemicals by 50 percent compared to the Europeans’ 35
percent.94 For agricultural  commodities, rates decreased by 15 to 18 percent and
negotiators agreed to a strong antidumping resolution which prohibited the below-
cost  price  sale  of  goods.95 This  was  brought  about  by  the  GATT  Anti-Dumping
Agreement, which had a section on development in the 1960s.96 It also prevented
industrial nations from entering into trade agreements with less-developed nations
that would be reciprocal  in nature.97 The US, which had in the past had a trade
surplus, moved towards a trade deficit  after the Kennedy Round implementations
were made.98 
During the Kennedy Round, there was an attempt made by contracting states to
reduce the impact on non-tariff barriers (NTBs), which were addressed as Codes in
smaller agreements, separately, as well as an attempt to address major concerns
including interests of developing countries by expanding the GATT.99 There was also
the formulation of ‘plurilateral agreements’ which were binding only on signatories to
this agreement as well as the creation of special rules for developing countries under
the  Principle  of  Reciprocity.100 The  benefits  that  were  afforded  to  developing
countries  in  this  round  were  more  theoretical  than  practical,  for  example,  tariff
87 The General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) of 1947.
88 Crowley note 47 44.
89 Bown note 44 15.
90 K Bagwell & RW Staiger ‘An economic theory of GATT’ (1999) 89(1) American Economic Review 
215–248.
91 Crowley note 47 44.
92 What-When-How In-Depth Tutorials and Information. Available at http://what-when-how.com/the-
american-economy/kennedy-round-1964-1967/, date accessed 15 August 2018.
93 Ibid.
94 Ibid.
95 Ibid.
96 World Trade Organization. Available at 
https://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/tif_e/fact4_e.htm, date accessed 15 August 2018.
97 What-When-How In-Depth Tutorials and Information note 92.
98 Ibid.
99 Zeiler note 80 152.
100 Toye note 49 124.
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concessions on special interest products were not granted even though they were
crucial  to  their  economies.101 Items that  were of  particular  interest  to LDCs were
treated less favourably than goods traded by their developed counterparts, such as
tariff cuts on semi-manufactures. This did not assist LDCs with an interest in such an
industry,  with  the most  significant  losses coming from chemicals,  machinery and
transport  equipment,  which at  the time were not  major  interests of  LDCs.102 The
inability of LDCs to offer reciprocal concessions was seen as a major barrier that in
turn limited developed countries from opening up their own markets as well.103 Also,
exporters of processed raw materials faced higher tariffs than on unprocessed raw
materials, which was a mechanism used to protect processing firms in the importing
country as well as to discourage developing countries from establishing their own
processing industries.104
(ii) The Tokyo round
As a result, the Tokyo Declaration of 1973 stated that the basic goals of this round’s
negotiations  were  firstly  to  expand  and  liberalise  world  trade  and  secondly  to
improve developing countries’ trading strength.105 Even though developed countries
had  granted  preferences,  albeit  begrudgingly  so,  their  effectiveness  was  limited
through the use of exemptions, tariff quotas, and market disruption clauses.106 The
Tokyo  Rounds  of  1973-79  brought  about  a  change  of  approach  as  developing
countries  focused  on  negotiating  for  ‘special  and  favourable  treatment’  in  areas
where  they  thought  that  these  provisions  needed  to  be  applicable.107 These
negotiations  were  intense and developed countries  were  of  the  opinion  that  this
intervention into the original GATT business was uncalled for. However, developing
countries  viewed  GATT 1947 as  an agreement  for  the  developed and  wealthier
contracting states because political savviness was valued ahead of the rule of law,
including a system which would adhere to it.108 
This led to the development of Codes relating to NTBs, technical barriers to trade,
import  licensing  procedures and customs valuations,  which  were  designed to  fill
gaps in the GATT rules by clarifying the operation of existing procedures and helping
to  ensure  that  all  industrialised  countries  accepted  the  same  obligations.109 The
protectionism that developed countries had covered in the cloak of their economic
needs and had been operating under was challenged by developing countries in
101 R Hudec Developing countries in the GATT legal system (2010) 46.
102 Overseas Development Institute: The Tokyo Round and Developing Countries 1977. Available at 
https://www.odi.org/publications/5363-gatt-tokyo-round-developing-countries accessed on 16 
December 2018.
103 Ibid.
104 Ibid.
105 GM Meier ‘The Tokyo round of multilateral trade negotiations and the developing countries’ (1981) 
13(2) Cornell International Law Journal 239.
106 Meier note 105 240.
107 K Morton & P Tulloch Trade and developing countries 1st ed (2011) 57. J 
108 J Pauwelyn ‘The transformation of world trade’ (2005) 104(1) Michigan Law Review 11.
109 MA Kakabadse ‘The Tokyo round and after’ (1981) 37(7) The World Today/The Royal Institute of 
International Affairs 309.
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their insistence on the need for special  and favourable treatment where this was
deemed feasible and appropriate in order to address their economic vulnerability; the
need  for  a  relationship  which  leaned  more  towards  moral  justness  rather  than
reciprocity; with the most important fact of all being that technical barriers were more
of a stumbling block than tariff barriers regarding the ability to trade.110 
(iii) The Uruguay round
Notably, during the Uruguay Round (UR), held in Punta del Este, for the first time,
developing nations reached agreement to take into recognition patents, copyrights,
and other  forms of  intellectual  property  while  also bringing trade in services and
trade-related  health  and  safety  regulations  under  a  multilateral111 set  of  rules.112
These were in  exchange for  developed countries agreeing to remove barriers to
trade in agriculture, textiles, and apparel, which harmed lower-cost producers from
developing nations.113 During this landmark round, further attempts were made to
develop provisions that would lower unfair agricultural subsidies as well as address
developed  countries’  disruptive  practices  in  the  developing  world’s  agricultural
sector.  This  was  the  first  time  that  issues  pertaining  to  agriculture  had  been
discussed and this led to ‘special  treatment’  being afforded to certain agricultural
products by means of exemption from various GATT rules.114 As such, this round’s
most  prominent  feature  was  the  discussion  relating  to  agricultural  produce  and
lowering the barriers, that is, tariffs that hampered trade in agricultural goods.115 Also,
during this  round,  the US was of  the opinion that  developing countries ought  to
graduate from their needs of needing ‘special and differential treatment’ due to the
progressive economies of the developing world.116 It was also during this Round that
the Dispute Settlement Understanding (DSU) was formalised, which has been used
mostly  by  developing  countries  since  its  inception.117 This  assisted  developing
countries with their negotiation standpoint and assisted them in reining in developed
countries which regularly transgressed particular rules in the WTO Agreements that
had been put in place to assist trade.
There were several pertinent issues which led to the creation of the WTO. These
were discussed during the UR which began in 1986. They had been borne out of the
loopholes which had been created by the GATT apparatus. Among them was the
dispute resolution mechanism which was not functioning as had been envisioned.
110 Hudec note 101 73. 
111 Included were Tariffs, Agriculture, Standards and safety, Textiles, Services, Intellectual property, 
Anti-dumping, subsidies etc, Non-tariff barriers, Plurilaterals and Trade policy reviews.
112 World Trade Organization: The Uruguay Round. Available at 
https://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/tif_e/fact5_e.htm, accessed on 16 November 2018.
113 T Kelly ‘Why are developing countries still negotiating? The WTO’s successes at the Doha round’ 
(2005) 48(3) Economic Growth 110.
114 South Africa-US Relations http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/rsa/forrel-us.htm, accessed 
on 13 November 2018. 
115 World Trade Organization note 112.
116 E Preeg ‘The Uruguay rounds negotiations and the creation of the WTO’ in The Oxford Handbook 
on The World Trade Organization (2012) 168.
117 Van den Bossche note 83 53.
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Also, a wide variety of products were not covered under the GATT and therefore
provision was made for them during this round: agricultural products and textiles.
There  was  also  the  realisation  that  administered trade  protection  was  restricting
trade  in  the  form  of  anti-dumping  (AD)  duties,  voluntary  export  restraints  and
countervailing  duties  which  were  distorting  trade  patterns  in  important  sectors.118
Further, there was an emergence in trade in services in relation to which the GATT
had  no  rules,  including  issues  such  as  intellectual  property,  which  had  minimal
regulation in developing countries. Finally, rules regarding trade-related investment
measures were also a hot topic in dispute.119 
2.3 World Trade Organization (WTO)
The biggest-ever  round  of  GATT negotiations  is  what  led  to  the  creation  of  the
WTO.120 The  agreement  which  effectively  established  the  WTO  was  signed  in
Marrakesh in April 1994 and came into force on 1 January 1995.121 The WTO was a
response to a set of challenges which confronted the international community. 122 The
WTO forms part of a global system where countries are aligned differently from the
GATT period - not only in trade but in other matters too.123 It has three prominent
interrelated functions, which involve negotiation, illumination and litigation.124 The two
most important aspects of the mandate of the WTO involve its objectives and its
function, which are contained in the Preamble of the WTO agreement. The ultimate
objectives are: 
‘the increase of standards of living, the attainment of full employment, the growth
of real income and effective demand, and the expansion of production of, and
trade in, goods and services’.125
The WTOs other  functions include a  list  of  activities  involving  implementation  of
WTO agreements, negotiation of new agreements, settlement of disputes, review of
trade  policies,  co-operation  with  other  organisations  and  technical  assistance  to
developing countries.126 Negotiations within the WTO are an ongoing process, which
can last for years at a time; currently the 9th round, which began in Doha, 127 is still
ongoing.128 The  doors  of  the  WTO  were  opened  initially  with  a  number  of  128
118 Crowley note 47 43.
119 Crowley note 47 43–44.
120 EC Schlemmer ‘South Africa and the WTO ten years into democracy’ (2004) 29 South African 
Yearbook of International Law 125.
121 Van den Bossche note 83 85. 
122 Van Grasstek note 31 8.
123 Ibid. 10.
124 Bown note 44 10.
125 Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization. Available at 
https://www.wto.org/english/docs_e/legal_e/04-wto.pdf, accessed on 16 December 2018. 
126 Van den Bossche note 83 86, 89.
127 The name refers to where the rounds began but they usually commence in different places around 
the globe after the initial meeting.
128 Collins note 39 10.
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members.129 In 2002, there were 146 members, which comprised approximately 97
percent of the region in world trade.130 Around 2015, the membership of the WTO
was believed to be in the region of 161 member countries.131 But since then, over
164 countries had signed and acceded to the agreement as at 29 July 2016.132
What takes place is the negotiation of an individually tailored agreement referred to
as an Accession Protocol, which sets out the precise terms under which said country
is agreeing to join the WTO community.133 Approval must be granted by all existing
members. This is accompanied by common conditions such as phase-in periods for
countries that are not yet full market economies. Accession negotiations can take
several years. This reflects how important WTO membership has become as well as
the  challenge  for  some  nations  to  align  their  trade-related  intentions  with  the
principles of the WTO. It has become a form of recognition of maturity to be able to
take part in discussions that involve economic activities on the world stage.134
The WTO is often believed to only pay special attention to the problems of more
developed  countries.135 To  address  this  concern,  the  Committee  on  Trade  and
Development (CTD), established in the Agreement establishing the WTO,136 is the
focal point for the work relating to development in the WTO and exists under it to
assist developing countries as trade partners.137 The four areas specifically focused
on by the  CTD  are the Technical Assistance Programs, Special and Differential
Treatment Provisions, Small Economies and Aid for Trade.138 There are additional
works139 that form the supporting framework.140 The CTD has a Sub-Committee on
LDCs to assist with specialised attention targeting areas where focus lacks in order
to facilitate trade on a much larger scale in industries that require development.141
The Sub-Committee on LDCs was established in July 1995 - 6 months after the
129 Members can only be countries and not companies, cities or non-governmental organizations 
(NGOs). Joining is formally known as accession and differs for each new member country. 
130 Crowley note 47 42.
131 Collins note 39 8.
132 Members and Observers. Available at 
https://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/tif_e/org6_e.htm, accessed on 13 November 2018.
133 The accession process – the procedures and how they have been applied. Available at 
https://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/acc_e/cbt_course_e/c4s10p1_e.htm, accessed on 
16 December 2018.
134 Collins note 39 8.
135 E-notes. Available at https://www.enotes.com/homework-help/what-focus-wto-committee-trade-
development-click-426437, accessed on 15 April 2018.
136 Committee on Trade and Development of the WTO, 1 May 1997, International Centre for Trade 
and Sustainable Development (ICTSD). Available at 
https://www.ictsd.org/bridges-news/bridges/news/the-committee-on-trade-and-development-of-the-
wto, accessed 17 August 2018.
137 World Trade Organization, https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/devel_e/d3ctte_e.htm, accessed 
on 17 August 2018.
138 World Trade Organization note 137.
139 The additional works are the Eighth Ministerial Conference, Regional Trade Agreements and 
Preferential Schemes, Electronic Commerce, Duty-free Quota-free Implementation Review, 
Developing Countries and Multilateral Trading Systems.
140 World Trade Organization note 137.
141 World Trade Organization note 137.
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establishment of the CTD - to bring to the attention of the WTO the challenges it
faced. The Sub-Committee reports to the CTD and conducts its work similarly.142 
The Dispute Settling Mechanism is one of the most revered systems to come out of
the  formulation  of  the  WTO.143 Whenever  a  dispute  cannot  be  resolved  among
members, it’s referred to a panel of three judges.144 When found to be in violation of
the GATT rules and obligations, there are three options available to members.145 A
complainant can appeal and have the case retried in front of an appellate body or it
can amend its laws in transgression with the DSU and bring them in line with GATT,
or  it  can  keep  the  laws  as  they  are  and  face  ‘measured  retaliation’  from  the
aggrieved partners.146 The WTO institution does not enforce any of its policies on
countries but instead it is an institution with a set of self-enforcing agreements which
are challenged by member countries by identifying one another’s missteps through
formal dispute settlement.147 
2.4 The African Union
The  African  Union  (AU)  was  formed  in  2002  after  having  operated  as  the
Organisation of African Unity (OAU) since 1963.148 Its aim is to protect the continent
instead  of  the  sovereignty  of  individual  states.149 It  has  focused  its  work  on
reinforcing African independence from European countries which had ruled forcefully
over Africa for decades.150 Its distinguishable from the OAU due to its different focus
which  leans  towards  democracy,  human  rights  and  economic  development.151 It
moved away from supporting struggle movements for freedom from colonialism and
apartheid  and  is  now  working  towards  development  integration  on  the  African
continent.152 It consists of 53 member countries and is modelled on the structure of
the  European  Union  (EU).153 The  AU  is  recognised  the  world  over  as  the  only
international organisation which allows intervention in a member state on the basis of
humanitarian grounds.154 The AU’s vision is to:
142 World Trade Organization note 137.
143 Van den Bossche note 83 53.
144 Ibid.
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147 Bown note 44 20. 
148 The African Union Commission (AUC): Agenda 2063 – ‘The Africa We Want’ Draft Document 6. 
Available at http://www.un.org/en/africa/osaa/pdf/au/agenda2063-framework.pdf, accessed on 
16 December 2018.
149 S Hanson ‘The African Union’. Available at 
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150 DL Badejo, The African Union New York: Chelsea House Publishers (2008) 12.
151 Ibid.
152 AU in a nutshell. Available at https://au.int/en/au-nutshell accessed on 4 December 2018.
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154 R Cohen & WG O’Neill ‘Last stand in Sudan?’ (2006) Bulletin of Atomic Scientists 52.
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‘build  an  integrated,  prosperous  and  peaceful  Africa,  an  Africa  driven  and
managed  by  its  own  citizens  and  representing  a  dynamic  force  in  the
international arena’.155
2.4.1 Agenda 2063
The AU has made efforts towards assisting development through the formulation of
Agenda 2063. It was formulated by the African Union (AU) at its 50th anniversary in
2013  –  the  Golden  Jubilee  of  the  inception  of  the  African  Union  (AU).156 This
framework  is  aimed  at  assisting  socioeconomic  transformation  on  the  African
continent over the next 50 years, having begun in 2013.157 It  builds on past and
current initiatives158 that outline how it intends to achieve the objectives it has set out
for  itself.  Agenda  2063  was  inspired  by  the  Lagos  Plan  of  Action,159 the  Abuja
Treaty160 and the New Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD161).162 At this
Summit, the African Union Commission (AUC) was tasked to create this continental
agenda, which is a people-driven process, together with the New Partnership for
Africa’s Development’s  (NEPAD) Planning and Coordinating Agency (NPCA),  the
African Development  Bank  (AfDB)  and  the  UN Economic  Commission  for  Africa
(UNECA).163 Areas identified for progress are listed as The Eight Priorities of the 50th
Anniversary Solemn Declaration, which are a definition of the ‘continental agenda
and are to be integrated into various regional and national development plans’.164
Agenda 2063 considers past achievements as well  as the global  and continental
context  under  which  these  have  been  achieved  and  how  these  affect  the
implementation of transformation efforts.165 It is described as the ‘continuation of the
155 Different consultations were made with the following stakeholders: Academicians and Think Tanks,
Civil Society, Planning Experts from Ministries of Planning, Women, Youth, Media, Private sector, and
RECs representatives.
156 The African Union Commission (AUC): Agenda 2063 note 148 6.
157 Agenda 2063 note 148.
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Programme for Infrastructural Development in Africa (PIDA), the Comprehensive Africa Agricultural 
Development Programme (CAADP), The New Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD), 
Regional Plans and Programmes and National Plans.
159 The Lagos Plan of Action (officially the Lagos Plan of Action for the Economic Development of 
Africa, 1980–2000) was an Organisation of African Unity-backed plan to increase Africa's self-
sufficiency.
160 The Abuja Treaty was a treaty signed by member nations of the OAU (now AU) in 1991. The aim 
was to establish and promote economic, social and cultural development between African states.
161 NEPAD is the implementing agency of the African Union, facilitating and coordinating the 
development of continent-wide programmes and projects, mobilising resources and engaging the 
global community, regional economic communities and countries in transforming Africa.
162 S Turner, J Cilliers & B Hughes ‘Reducing poverty in Africa: Realistic targets for the post-2015 
MDGs and Agenda 2063.’ (2014) Institute for Security Studies 1.
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Pan African drive for self-determination, freedom, progress and collective prosperity’
in  the  draft  document.166 The  aim  of  Agenda  2063  is  ‘to  integrate  national  and
regional development to ensure growth and sustainable development through the
use of the continent’s natural resources to the benefit of all Africans’. 167 One of the
unique points of this Agenda is its bottom-up approach which considers the voice of
the  African  people  and  what  they  want  as  opposed  to  the  usual  bureaucratic
methods.168 There is a set of milestones that are based on a timeframe which the
Agenda intends to achieve which require the participation of African people.169 These
targets  aim at  the distant  future and the  Africa which Africans desire  to  see for
themselves  and  their  offspring.  This  can  be  achieved  through  the  intended
integration and development of the AU through Agenda 2063, which makes mention
of  an  ‘African  approach  to  development  and  transformation’ of  which  the  only
shortcoming is that it does not outline what this is and how it will be realised.170
2.5 Development within multilateral trading systems
2.5.1 Definition of development 
The concept of development is almost as old as civilisation itself and has developed
continuously throughout the centuries from as far back as the 17th century, when
several authors such as Leibniz (1646-1716) inaugurated it as the concept of infinite
progress,  and  with  Buffon  (1707-1788)  arguing  in  the  mid-18th  century  that  the
benchmark  for  civilisation  and  development  is  the  European  standard.171 The
Marquis of Condorcet (1734-1794) took it a step further and suggested Europeans
would compensate countries they colonised through developing them, which was the
predominant idea that lasted throughout until the mid- to late 19th century.172 Fast
forward  into  the  20th  century,  and  these  ideas  had  metamorphosed  into
decolonisation  of  previously  colonised  countries  in  the  1960s,  which  led  to  the
placing of the need for development of what was referred to then as the Third World
to the forefront.173 Considerable steps were taken in the 20th century to address the
development question,  such as the creation of the United Nation Conference on
Trade and Development (UNCTAD) in December 1964, which was created to bridge
the gap not covered by institutions that had been created because of the WW II.174
This was a result of the continued perseverance of developing countries in voicing
their concerns which culminated in UNCTAD which is a permanent forum, with a
166 Ibid. 8.
167 CC Ngang ‘Towards a right-to-development governance in Africa’ (2018) Journal of Human Rights 
107.
168 About Agenda 2063. Available at https://au.int/agenda2063/about accessed on 4 December 2018.
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governing  board  that  worked  principally  in  promoting  international  trade.175 Its
intention is accelerating economic development,  formulation of the principles and
policies on international trade, and problems related to economic development.176
Nowadays there is a variety of contemporary definitions of development varying from
economic  growth  development,  to  development  as  a  fiction,  to  sustainable
development.  As  quoted  in  the  United  Nations  Development  Program  (UNDP)
development is defined as:
‘expanding the range of choices for the population that allows development to 
become more democratic and participative in access to income, participation in 
decisions and enjoyment of human, economic and political liberties’.177
Despite its being used widely, an actual set definition of development is still elusive
owing to its varying scope, as it can be found in a variety of fields.178 The definition of
the term ‘development’ is still vague, but it has often been used to refer to a set of
beliefs  and  assumptions  regarding  the  nature  of  social  progress.179 It  is  often
narrowed down to a perspective which is more focused on economic growth.180 It is
believed that the modern version has its origin in politics where it was used as a tool
by President Truman who intended to include it as an ‘original’ point in his 1949
Inaugural Address speech.181 Ngang states that there exists a right to development
which is not dependent on international co-operation but is instead an assertion of
self-determination  of  cultural  and  socioeconomic  circumstances  of  Africa.182
Measures including foreign investment, lowering and raising of trade barriers, well-
digging and literacy campaigns were legitimised in the hope that  they would aid
development, even making extremely contradictory policies look like they would by
existing improve the lives of poor people.183
2.5.2 Trade and development
Numerous  discussions  around  links  between  trade  and  development  exist  that
involve  professionals  such  as  economists,  development  practitioners,  academics
and policy makers who have made significant contributions to the discourse.184 There
are  still  questions  remaining  about  the  positive  impact  of  international  trade  on
development, specifically liberalised trade and how it relates to developing countries,
because  of  the  obstacle-filled  process  relating  to  trade,  sustainable  growth  and
175 Ibid. 106.
176 UNCTAD – Final Act, UN Document E/CoNF.46/141, 1964.
177 Soares & Quintella note 171 108.
178 G Rist ‘Development as a buzzword’ (2007) 17(4–5) Development in Practice 485.
179 Rist note 178 485.
180 Ngang note 167 108. 
181 Rist note 178 485.
182 Ngang note 167 112.
183 Rist note 178 486.
184 The Link: Trade and Development Part One. Available at http://www.acs-aec.org/index.php?
q=trade/the-link-trade-and-development-part-one, accessed on 22 August 2018.
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ultimately development.185 However,  the structure/framework of international  trade
has  evolved  and  become  multi-dimensional  in  its  links  to  development  and  its
process in which it has a crucial role to play.186 Regardless of this, Ngang argues that
the  implementation  of  development  in  least  developed  and  developing  African
countries as envisioned in Article 22 of the African Charter has remained stagnant
because of the inability  to decipher how to realise these provisions practically. 187
Trade is an important aspect to the holistic path of development, so much so that
more countries are pursuing it because of its relation to a myriad of dimensions 188 in
the  development  sphere.189 However,  it  is  important  to  note  that  there  is  no
guarantee  that  participation  in  the  multilateral  trading  systems  leads  to
development.190
The GATT being the first multilateral mechanism for trade relations would have had
development  incorporated  into  it.  Acknowledgement  and  implementation  of  this
aspect has been the conundrum needing solving. This is similar to the problems
faced by African initiatives such as the Lagos Plan of Action and the Abuja treaty. 191
Development includes factors like the environment, economy as well as social and
political factors which have been stated to, amongst other things raise the standards
of living, ensure full employment and a large, steadily-growing volume of real income
and  effective  demand.192 The  GATT’s  mandate  was  not  to  directly  address
underdevelopment as this would have limited its capacity and functional relevancy in
addressing  symptoms  of  underdevelopment  such  as  inadequacy  of  the  trade  of
developing  countries;  unsatisfactory,  or  unfair  terms  of  trade;  and  unsustainable
structures  of  trade  relations.193 Instead,  it  contributed  in  other  ways  through  the
special  treatment  of  developing  countries  -  exempting  developing  countries  from
certain  aspects  of  the  GATT’s  discipline  through  according  them  preferential
treatment.194 Lehloenya and Mpya argue that the inclusion of citizens through the
operation of civil society organisations195 as well as the integration of small, medium
and micro enterprises (SMMEs) into the regional economies of African countries can
assist in strengthening ties and bridging the gap.196 
Although  mainstream  scholars  ignore  the  origins  of  the  African  concept  of
development,  its  necessity  was  born  from  how industrialised  countries  exploited
185 The Link: Trade and Development Part One note 184.
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Africa during colonisation.197 Since the formation of the GATT, developing countries
have long been campaigning for their interests, seeking fulfilment of their demands
for greater market access, removal of barriers and developmental situations to be
given more consideration regarding their exports to developed countries.198 It was
during the discussion of the Doha Development Agenda (DDA) that industrialised
countries  took  the  decision  to  take  the  concerns  of  developing  countries  more
seriously,  especially  after  the  unsuccessful  negotiating  round  that  took  place  in
Seattle in 1999, where developing countries were opposed to numerous submissions
that were made.199 These demands would require significant political incentives that
would motivate developed countries to induce a significant move in this direction.
This was further assisted by convincing demonstrations that economic difficulties of
developing countries were linked to commercial practices by developed countries -
this confirmed in the publication of the ‘Panel of Exports Report’ or the ‘Harberler
Report.200 It contained strong evidence indicating that developing countries were in
dire need of increasing revenues from exports if significant economic progress was
to be made with the trade policies of developed countries.201 
Action programmes were followed by the GATT and the creation of an institutional
mechanism called the Committee III, which was to focus on developmental aspects
of  trade  and ways to  expand  developing  country  trade relations.202 Furthermore,
developed  countries  made  more  concessions  as  a  way  to  lessen  alienation  of
developing  countries  and  proceeded  with  the  strengthening  of  the  legal  and
institutional basis through the ‘creation of Part IV, entitled Trade and Development,
which  gave  to  developing  countries  a  great  deal  of  verbiage  but  fewer  precise
commitments.’203 Ngang rightly argues that other developmentally intended models
have not been able to propel Africa in a direction which supports its development.204
In addition, Kenneth Dam believed the inclusion of Part IV did not achieve a lot in
relation  to  precise  commitments  similar  to  the  way  in  which  the  Special  and
Differential  Treatment enabling clause formulated in  the Tokyo Round led to  the
belief that the GATT was indifferent to the interests of developing countries.205 What
is considered the most legally important statement of Part IV was that developed
countries should not expect reciprocity for commitments they have made in trade
negotiations.206 This  subsequently  paved  the  way  for  the  General  System  of
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Preferences (GSP), where developed countries agreed to grant trade preferences to
developing countries.207 However, developing African countries engaged in trade with
developed countries still  face challenges,208 and Ngang advocates for the right to
development  as  an  approach  which  could  emancipate  least  developed  and
developing African countries from seeking assistance from developed countries for
their own problems.209
Developed countries, such as those in the EU, have different approaches to their
trade policy with developing countries from other developed countries as they aim to
increase  exports  of  developing  countries,  as  is  observed  with  the  Trade,
Development and Cooperation Agreement  (TDCA).210 The requirement for  this  to
take  place  is  that  for  preferential  market  access  to  be  granted,  the  competitive
advantage of the EU must not be threatened by these increased imports.211 This is
one of the restrictive provisions identified by Lehloenya that limit  the flexibility  of
developing African countries as they have to tread lightly and not transgress the
obligations  of  prior  international  agreements  into  which  they  have  entered.212
Additionally, what assists developing countries is that there are potential gains to be
derived from large-scale production, particularly in specialisation.213 This ranges from
the learning process involved in trade, as well as from international competition when
the home market is too small to allow such competition, thereby enabling growth in
sectors that have potential to thrive globally.214 Apart from manufacturing, developing
countries’ shares in world exports of manufactured goods are small, or even tiny,
and the scope for increase correspondingly large.215 Therefore, increased exports
from  developing  countries  would  be  suffocated  by  the  restrictions  of  developed
country  markets.  For  instance,  developing  countries  supply  three-quarters  of  the
world exports of sugar; however, their exports are limited to one-fifth of the world
production of sugar.216 Observers representing the interests of poor countries are
more inclined to believe that participation in the UR and in the WTO have thus far
produced few benefits for developing countries.217
2.6 Conclusion 
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Development  has  undoubtedly  been  an  important  aspect  of  trade  over  several
decades. This was an agenda that was championed fully by countries that were in
need of  this mechanism. Although it  is  a  concept  which was largely founded by
developed countries, they are in a large part responsible for this need. Had it not
been  for  the  legacy  of  colonialism,  perhaps  developing  countries  would  not  be
labelled as such and would be in a far more favourable position. Throughout the
various  rounds  of  the  GATT  and  subsequently  the  WTO,  developing  countries
realised that they could achieve more as a collective as it came to light that they
were  all  in  similar  positions.  Tactics  of  divide-and-conquer  used  by  developed
nations  were  slowly  being  realised  by  developing  countries  and  they  used  the
platform afforded to them to speak out against this through the demands which they
made through the mechanisms that they had advocated.
Although this has been a work in progress, the intention is to reach a stage where
developing  countries  no  longer  have  to  seek  benefits  such  as  preferences  but
instead will be able to stand as individual countries and to negotiate without seeking
assistance from their fellow countrymen. The purpose is to now look forward into the
future  and  to  take  the  necessary  steps  in  order  to  ensure  that  this  objective  is
reached. The underlying factor in all of this is to alleviate circumstances of poverty,
unemployment and low quality of life which are predominantly present in developing
countries. The irony is that it is developing countries which have the vast majority of
natural resources the world over, but it is still  the developed countries that seem
instead to benefit in the long run. 
This chapter aimed to show to what extent development has been a factor between
developed and developing countries. It cannot be denied that this is an important
aspect with regard to trade relations. Inequality is still rife in the majority of the world
and the need for its acceleration is urgent now, more than ever.  What has been
established  is  that  this  concept  of  development  has  had  a  constant  presence
between the two aisles consisting of developed and developing countries. This has
been the case to such an extent that legislation and forums as well as organisations
have been formed in order to establish it.
This  chapter  has  shown  that  overall  or  sustained  development  of  developing
countries is on ongoing topic of discussion when there is interaction or discussions
between developed and developing countries. What is concerning, however, is the
rate at which it takes place which needs improvement. The next chapter will deal
with an overview of political and trade relations between SA and the US.
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CHAPTER THREE: 
OVERVIEW OF THE TRADE AND POLITICAL RELATIONS
BETWEEN SOUTH AFRICA AND THE UNITED STATES 
OF AMERICA
3.1 Introduction
South Africa (SA) and the United States of America (US) seemed to be great allies
during  the  early  days  of  democracy  when  Presidents  Nelson  Mandela  and  Bill
Clinton  shared  a  publicly  well-known  friendship.218 This  gave  the  impression  to
onlookers that relations between the two countries were in good condition and could
only get better. The reasoning behind this perception was important as bridges were
being built and relations being mended following the apartheid era, which had seen
SA’s exclusion from major trade relations with numerous countries. As such, post-
apartheid SA, with former President Mandela at the helm, was eager for the country
to establish its economic and political position. 
This study seeks to determine whether this was indeed always the nature of relations
or whether it was an opportunity to capitalise on the dawn of democracy. After all,
SA’s  new-found  freedom  and  the  subsequent  changes  that  ensued  had  all  the
ingredients of a story that would be told for many generations to come. The narrative
when  this  story  is  relayed  has  largely  been  around  how  the  release  of  Nelson
Mandela brought freedom to the people of SA as it was the first step which led to his
election as the first president of the new democratic dispensation. There are ample
explanations for the international communities’ lack of a collective approach towards
SA and the apartheid system which are discussed below. One of them is that despite
the stance of certain groups, countries and organisations, the literature reveals that
such countries collectively lacked the political and economic will to make a decisive
stand. With SA being rich in mineral  resources and key agricultural  outputs,  this
made it a key trade partner for some states. 
Against this background, this chapter seeks to determine the trade dynamics during
the apartheid regime between SA and the US and the extent to which the US has
thus far assimilated itself into SA since the governmental change post-1994. Many of
the functions of modern systems being made use of today derive a considerable
amount of their foundations from previous regimes. It is naturally the logical thing to
do when a transformation takes place that utilisation of helpful  material,  although
used arbitrarily previously, is the point of departure in charting a new course. It is
commonly argued that the apartheid system exploited most indigenous peoples and
was able to build the infrastructure present today. 
218 ‘Bill Clinton talks about his friendship with Nelson Mandela’ CBS News 5 December 2013. 
Available at https://www.cbsnews.com/news/bill-clinton-talks-about-his-friendship-with-nelson-
mandela/, accessed on 20 September 2018.
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3.2 A brief history of trade between South Africa and the United States 
Interestingly, trade between these two countries can be traced as far back as in the
1680s,  when American  ships  transported  slaves from Madagascar  via  the  Cape
Colony, where the Dutch East India Company (DEIC) had set up victualling and
repair facilities.219 SA was known of by the US in the 17th century because of its
reputation for slaves – which evidence suggests were from Mozambique – and as
the gateway to the Indian Ocean to other colonies where the US had other economic
interests.220 According to Thomson, the 19th century was when regular trade began
to be conducted between the US and SA.221 The former’s ships brought with them
lumber, wheat, and tobacco and in exchange received wine, ostrich feathers and
Asian re-exports.222 The most valuable commodities traded during this period were
wool and hides.223 
Various other countries would use Cape Town as a way station and occasionally US
trading ships would be found there where they would be supplied with fresh water
and a place to rest and replenish their energy.224 Other groups active in that area at
that time were the whalers.225 Missionaries and prospectors were also found in SA
with the former through the American Board of Commissioners for Foreign Missions
(ABCFM),226 which was the leading church in the US at the time. As such, Whytock
explains that the relations between these two countries date back to 1799 when the
US established one of its first diplomatic posts as a new country in Cape Town.227
Fast forward to the period in which the discovery of diamonds in Kimberly during the
1860s and gold  in  the  1870s caused thousands of  experienced American miner
immigrants to descend on SA.228 Using their expertise, they eventually became the
management of half  the mines229 and naturally this resulted in the passing on of
various  lucrative  contracts  to  the  US companies230 that  were  operational  in  this
market.231 This  carried  on  for  several  decades  and  saw  various  American
companies232 establishing bases in what was then referred to as the Union of South
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Africa,233 and later the Republic of South Africa,234 which served their interests very
well  through until  post-World  War  I  (WW I).235 The main  attraction  of  SA to  US
transnational corporations was based on the potential return on their investments,
which  averaged  around  13.72  percent  from  1950  through  to  1990.236 This  was
considerably better than the return it received worldwide, which stood slightly lower
at 11.2 percent, which is a jarring observation when considering all the countries the
US traded with back then.237 
South Africa at that time had arguably the biggest and most developed economy in
Africa with a large population size and a GDP of $4,395 billion in 1960, $9,422 billion
in 1969, $11,339 billion in 1971 and $26,210 billion in 1977.238 This was accounted
for partially by 17 percent of imports and 13 percent of exports from the US in 1971,
and which by 1980 were 1.3 percent and 1.1 percent respectively of overall trade
between  the  two  countries.239 In  1976  there  was  a  considerable  trade  surplus
between the US and SA, where the latter’s trade deficit was as high as $423 million.
By 1978, SA had spent over $500 million more on American goods than the next
biggest  customer,  Egypt.240 These  astronomical  figures  translated  into  a  positive
reputation for SA as a safe country for foreign investment with its being extremely
profitable  and also having the potential  to  grow even further.241 The US held 20
percent of SA’s foreign-held assets during this time242 and interestingly, in the 1980s
there were over 350 American multinational corporations in SA, averaging a foreign
direct investment of $2 billion.243
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On  the  political  and  human  rights  front,  the  similarity  shared  between  the  two
countries  was that  of  legislated  racial  segregation  and separation respectively.244
This put the US in a dilemma as to what its foreign policy should be towards a
country practising racial discrimination, considering the substantial investments that
had been made by multinationals from the US in SA.245 Clearly, this contradicted
their stance on democracy, freedom and equality when compared to the action taken
in relation to racial issues in SA and Africa as a whole.246 Organisations including
trade unions, universities and other groups developed well organised strategies to
pressurise the US government and corporations which had established themselves
in SA.247 The influence extended across borders as more African states248 that had
recently gained independence were becoming industrialised to a varying extent.249
This affected the global image of the US negatively as it  had interests in natural
resources, particularly oil, which were available in countries such as Nigeria; but it
could not form fruitful bilateral treaties because Nigeria refused to engage with the
US as long as it supported the status quo in SA.250 
As  mentioned  earlier,  business  and  trade  were  the  main  aspects  of  relations
between SA and the US throughout the 1900s, with the concern being mainly for
new business opportunities  and returns  on investment  that  were  profitable,251 so
much so that the US had no other concern than maintaining the ‘excellent’ trading
relationship it  had created with SA.252 Therefore, any questioning of the methods
employed by the apartheid government at the time would have severely hampered
the literal goldmine the US had stumbled on and subsequently proceeded to build
upon.253 Further,  World  War  II  brought  with  it  hostilities  and  a  disruption  of  the
traditional ties SA had had with the British, which saw trade linkages between the US
and SA strengthen as a result.254 With the economy emerging healthy after the war,
the relationship increased trade between the two countries.255 With this continued
economic relationship, US transnational corporations penetrated the Union of SA as
they had done earlier in the 1920s and 1930s. Their continued establishment and
continuous investment meant further prosperity for these nations even though this
was at the expense of a subjugated race of people.256 
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3.3 Apartheid
It  was in the year 1948 that apartheid was formally introduced after the National
Party’s  general  election  victory  in  which  only  white  people  were  allowed  to
participate.257 Moreover,  the  apartheid  system  saw  the  implementation  of
discriminatory legislation and policies with the sole purpose of separating races.258
The apartheid government was a valuable ally for the US to have because of its
stance on communism;  the  Cape sea route  through which  the  majority  of  trade
heading east passed; reserves of rare minerals; and a multitude of transnational US
corporations which  found the  SA market  to  be  profitable.259 Locally  there  was  a
somewhat  hostile  attitude  towards  the  US,  not  only  from  the  African  National
Congress (ANC), but also from the national government and domestic opposition. 260
This was because of the notion that all the US was concerned about was having SA
as an ally against the Soviet Union’s aggression in the region as well as economic
benefits.261 In return, this saw the US condone the atrocious human rights violations
perpetuated by the apartheid regime.262 
In practice, the approach of the US to SA and the rest of the world was solely based
on cold war demands and profitable economic ties rather than speaking out against
apartheid.263 Furthermore, the relationship between the countries during this period
was somewhat of a balancing act, although the apartheid system it had condoned
was in  contradiction  with  what  the  US supposedly  stood  for,  with  the  economic
benefits  of  maintaining  friendly  relations  with  the  apartheid  government  far
outweighing the former.264 Apartheid was clearly good for business, as 42 US firms
established local subsidiaries in SA between the beginning of apartheid in 1948 and
through  until  1960,  which  took  the  overall  total  of  USA  businesses  that  were
operating directly in the South African market to 160.265 Private direct investment and
exports from the USA doubled in the 1950s. As a result of this activity and most
importantly, the ties between these countries grew even stronger, with SA seeking
industrial guidance and financial aid, which ominously indicated that this relationship
was far from over.266 Further, USA investment and trade continued to rise rapidly with
direct investment starting off at $51 million in 1943 to $140 million in 1950 to $232
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million in 1959.267 USA corporate boardrooms were unbothered with human rights
violations  at  this  point  because  as  Thomson  simply  puts  it  that  he  priority  was
financial gain at all costs, which would later become a thorn in both these countries’
sides.268
3.3.1 Initiation of sanctions 
There  was  always  opposition  against  the  apartheid  system,  but  it  took  the
Sharpeville massacre of 21 March 1960269 to get the world’s attention. This event
portrayed how violent  a system apartheid was towards the indigenous people of
SA.270 There  were  calls  in  the  United  Nations  (UN)  for  sanctions  against  the
apartheid  government  because  of  the  massacre.271 In  1962,  during  the  General
Assembly of the UN, an initiation of a vote took place where there was a suggestion
that  SA  should  be  boycotted  through  member  states  withdrawing  diplomatic
representation, embargoing the ports and airspaces, preventing South African goods
being sold  in  various  territories  and barring  SA exports.  The  US,  however,  was
particularly not in favour of these suggestions.272 This attempt unfortunately did not
succeed because the Security  Council  of  the UN members consisting of  Britain,
France and the US refused to comply with this request, using their veto powers. 273
Through these actions Coleman-Adebayo accuses these countries of being a faithful
ally of the then racist apartheid regime.274 Unsurprisingly, during this period, no major
US  politician,  whether  Democrat  or  Republican,  openly  supported  the  calls  for
sanctions, albeit for various reasons.275 Countries which voted against the resolution
mostly consisted of imperialist and capitalist regimes such as Western Europe and
Spain, whose fascism and reactionary approaches were well known throughout the
world.276 
At grassroots level, actions against apartheid were in isolation and at a much smaller
scale. For example, picketing took place in San Francisco, where a ship carrying
South African goods was to be unloaded, involving members of organisations like
the  American  Committee  on  Africa  (ACOA),  the  National  Association  for  the
Advancement of Coloured People (NAACP) and the Congress on Racial Equality
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(CORE) in January 1963.277 These were some of  the more successful  groups in
raising  awareness  about  the  anti-apartheid  movement.278 Although  countries  the
world over were agreeing to the boycotting of all forms of relations with SA and its
apartheid government, according to Van Roekel, the imperialist countries of Britain,
the  US  and  France  continued  to  support  it  through  extended  trade,  capital
investments and the continued supply of arms and equipment, which as a result kept
apartheid operational.279 The US, SA and Britain were economically interdependent –
among other aspects – upon one another for various reasons, such as SA’s gold
production.  Prior  to  the  US dollar  becoming  the  reserve  for  most  of  the  world’s
currency, its value was derived from gold. 280 In order to maintain the stability of their
currencies, the US and Britain had to ensure the continued production of gold. These
two  countries  were  also  reliant  on  uranium for  their  nuclear  industry  during  the
1960s, which was also imported from SA, which illustrates why they would refuse to
permit sanctions to be implemented as they were heavily invested in the outcome
and how it would affect them.281 
There were three types of industries which were identified as crucial to maintaining
SA’s apartheid regime – oil, arms and finance.282 These functions were crucial to the
administration  as  they  directly  affected  the  economy  and  the  operation  of  the
apartheid regime, particularly oil  and arms, because they were used to neutralise
and contain any public unrest.283 Finance was essential for economic growth and oil
for domestic transport and without these, overall operations would grind to a halt.284
The arms embargo was initiated to  stop apartheid and SA’s aggressive attitude,
often resulting in military conflicts with surrounding countries such as Namibia.285 SA
was using the military on the battlefield and also as a means to maintain apartheid;
therefore, the international community saw this as a way to neutralise both issues.286
The nature of the embargo was voluntary as opposed to mandatory at this stage due
to the US’ and UK’s refusal to pursue the latter.287 
Oil production was a weakness for SA because it had no existing oil reserves which
trade partners would use as an opportunity to send a message through cutting off
their  supply.288 The  Organization  of  the  Petroleum  Exporting  Countries  (OPEC)
imposed an embargo which came into effect in 1973 because of apartheid and SA’s
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relationship  with  Israel.289 Supplying  almost  half  of  SA’s  crude  oil,  Qatar,  Saudi
Arabia and Iraq ceased all  oil  exports  to  SA.290 The UN General  Assembly also
attempted  to  enforce  sanctions  through  Resolution  1899  but  were  unable  to
persuade the Security Council to do this mandatorily.291 Eventually some countries292
voluntarily imposed sanctions.
SA was a developing country which required foreign investment to grow further, and
this in turn needed machinery and transport imports. SA also borrowed money from
the IMF and private banks, measures on which financial sanctions would have put a
significant strain.293 Some countries had already proceeded with these on their own
accord.294 In 1983, sanctions were imposed internationally when the IMF refused to
grant SA further funds.295 The US, using its influence in the IMF, refused to grant new
direct and portfolio investments, as well as loan credits under the Comprehensive
Anti-Apartheid Act (CAAA), with the European Economic Community (EEC) and the
Commonwealth banning new investments in 1986.296 
3.3.2 Delayed action and potential alternatives to sanctions
There was very little momentum gained in the first half of the 1960s in relation to
economic  disengagement  towards  the  apartheid  government,  which  had  been
suggested by the then ANC leader Albert  Luthuli.297 This resulted from a lack of
significant consumer imports from SA to other countries as well as there being no
support in the US Congress for this action.298 Also, there were arguments tabled in
the US Congress which suggested that sanctions were not the most constructive
method and approach to diffuse tensions if the intention was to build a non-racial
harmonious society. Instead, negotiation was the best possible avenue to attempt to
end  apartheid.299 The  reasoning  was  that  it  was  the  very  same people  that  the
General Assembly of the UN was attempting to assist – the oppressed indigenous
people of SA – that would be most negatively impacted if economic sanctions were
to  be  passed.300 Heads  of  government  in  Britain  and  Germany  concurred  that
sanctions were not the best approach to encourage political change in SA. 301 The
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idea  of  sanctioning  a  country  in  which  there  was  an  attempt  to  influence  its
operations and direction seemed contradictory, to say the very least.302 Ambassador
Satterthwaite was of the opinion that instead those sections of the white minority
which sought to bring about an evolution in racial relations and eventual equality
should  be  approached  and  build  upon  the  already  strengthened  ties  with  these
groups  instead.303 There  were  several  deliberations  that  explored  alternative
solutions,  but  in  effect,  the  apartheid  experiment  was  to  continue,  with  the
justification being that an international ban on South African trade and investment
would  result  in  unsavoury  humanitarian  consequences.304 This  ‘constructive
engagement’ approach did not lead to the ending of apartheid for years, which is
how sanctions eventually seemed the only viable solution.305
The following landmark event that highlighted the plight of indigenous South Africans
under the racist apartheid regime was to be the Soweto uprising on 16 June306 1976,
which took place in Soweto.307 This event gave effect to the to a voluntary arms
embargo which was put in place in 1963 and had not become mandatory until this
massacre.308 In  1977 the  UN imposed it  under  Security  Council  Resolution  418,
which included imports as well as exports.309 In 1984 Resolution 558 was created
and required members to cease importing ammunition, arms and military vehicles
from SA.310 The uprising led to such a build-up of tension and strife in the nation that
by  the  1980s  an  institution  of  a  state  of  emergency  in  1986  by  the  apartheid
government  was  the  eventual  result.311 The  apartheid  model  was  coming  under
continuous scrutiny and this as a result culminated in domestic pressure from within
the US to pass overall sanctions against SA.312 The administration of Ronald Reagan
was  opposed  to  sanctions  on  SA,  which  this  was  evident  in  their  approach  by
implementing a limited export ban.313 In 1986, the US Congress passed the CAAA,
314 which President Ronald Reagan had attempted to veto, albeit unsuccessfully.315
‘This Act contained a list banning importing materials from SA which included iron,
steel,  coal,  uranium,  textiles  and  agricultural  goods,  while  excluding  strategic
materials such as diamonds and most forms of gold.’316 This measure is considered
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one  of  the  decisive  blows  that  motivated  the  apartheid  regime  to  take  into
consideration  the  circumstances  around  them and  bring  them to  the  negotiating
table.317 
The direct impact  of  the trade-related sanctions was limited because SA created
methods to circumvent the sanctions, which at times was costly as it was through
import substitution.318 Countries319 that did not participate in the embargo allowed SA
to transship through them.320 As a result, terms of trade suffered, but export volumes
increased between 1985 and 1989 by 26 percent.321 It is estimated that the marginal
costs resulting from the trade sanctions amounted to the tune of $354 million or
0.5 percent of the Gross National Product (GNP).322 These events caused a mass
exodus of companies,323 investors and bank loans as a result of uncertainty of their
investments,  and also protest  action as activists made their  opinions known with
regard to the oppression that had been taking place.324 As a result of these internal
and external boycotts, the SA economy struggled.325 Evenett, using the gravity model
from 1978-1999, found that exports from the European Community (EC) and the US
decreased by 27 percent and 34 percent respectively during this period of time.326 
3.3.3 Lifting of sanctions
Sanctions against the South African apartheid government continued to be enforced
across administrations as George Bush Sr assumed the presidency after Ronald
Reagan.327 On the South African front, FW de Klerk had assumed office as the South
African President and he was viewed as a pragmatic individual by the US because of
his rhetoric.328 He demonstrated this through his conduct by unbanning the ANC and
the  Pan  African  Congress  (PAC),  the  release  of  Nelson  Mandela  and  the
commencement  of  the  transition  negotiations.329 These  were  three  of  six
prerequisites under section 311(a) of the CAAA which had to be met for sanctions to
be  lifted,  with  the  remaining  being  ‘the  calling  off  of  the  state  of  emergency;
repealing of unjust Acts of Parliament; and the initiation of transition negotiations in
good faith’, which were deemed to have been complied with in June 1991.330 
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Subsequently, in February 1992, there was the authorisation by President Bush that
the US Export-Import Bank could now offer guarantees and loans on contracts of
South  African  origin.331 The  Clinton  administration  enacted  the  South  African
Democratic Transition Support Act (SADTSA) in November 1993, which repealed the
remaining punitive provisions of sanctions, enforced under the CAAA and removed
all Export-Import Bank restrictions in relation to SA.332 The removal of sanctions did
not lead to a full  recovery in exports to the US in particular, which suggests that
adverse consequences of sanctions still remained after their removal.333
3.4 Democratic South Africa
For the newly formed democratic SA, the main priority was and still is to this day
economic  growth,  equal  distribution  of  wealth,  socioeconomic  improvements  and
service delivery,  among other  issues.334 Relations between SA and the US were
analysed and found to have been negatively impacted by Cold War politics and the
apartheid regime.335 This caused the incoming democratically elected South African
government to be wary of the intentions of the US, and it often tried to refrain from
agreeing with the US on issues in order to avoid appearing as if it were the puppet of
the US in the view of other African states that assisted it  during the struggle for
freedom from apartheid.336 The ANC winning SA’s first democratic election saw the
US ramp up its assistance with regard to development.337 With the pending ‘rainbow
nation’ under the new dispensation, excitement surrounding the country’s first-ever
democratic elections saw some companies338 that had left as a result of the CAAA
return; many of them which had previously left  perhaps did not anticipate an era
under  which  they  would  enjoy  as  much  unprecedented  success  as  they  had
previously.339 
Surprisingly,  the US had its own reservations in relation to the ties SA had and
disagreed with the relations the Mandela government had with regimes it found to be
objectionable.340 These included links  with  Russia (formerly  known as the  Soviet
Union),  Cuba,  Iran  and  Libya.341 Despite  this,  the  US  and  SA  were  somewhat
expected to be trade partners because of the economic and international views on
SA as well as the Mandela regime. The proposition that ‘all men are created equal’ is
stated in the Declaration of Independence342 and underpins the similar history of SA
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and the US which involved the transition from a legislated racist regime to a non-
racial society. 343 Also, at the dawn of its democracy, SA needed to develop trade
relations  with  trade  partners  both  old  and  new  to  signify  its  reincarnation  as  a
democratic  country  with  new  objectives  that  were  different  from  those  of  the
apartheid regime.344
This  led  African  countries,  particularly  those  which  had  assisted  SA  during  the
apartheid struggle, to the suggestion of the notion and belief that SA was a puppet of
the US.345 The reason for this was its willingness to comply with rules of entry set by
potential  investors  and  multilateral  organisations  that  included  liberalisation,
privatisation and tax reform.346 This could well have been true, because concurrently,
South African officials wanted to build trade relations as well as receive financial aid
from the US, but they were concerned with the terms and conditions which would
accompany this.347 SA was in a difficult position of having to set an example as a
leading country in Africa after recently liberating itself from apartheid rule as well as
maintaining good relations with African countries that assisted it during the struggle.
Moving forward, SA also had to engage in international relations, which was not a
straightforward transition.
The sanctions imposed for apartheid on SA affected the economy negatively and the
new government set out to fix this by opening up its market through the signing of
several  bilateral  and  multinational  agreements.348 Trevor  Manuel,  as  Trade  and
Industry Minister from 1994-1996, drastically removed tariff walls, that kept imports
out from Europe and the US, sooner than the World Trade Organization (WTO) had
required.349 This led to SA losing preferential trade responsibilities because it was
consistently importing far more goods from the US than it was selling locally.350 In
1995, there was pressure from Anglo American that lead to steel tariffs rising high
enough to justify new (highly subsidised) investments.351 In 1996, the US government
was not pleased with SA violating ‘the spirit of the WTO’ to which it had recently
assented, and also for the lack of transparency in its involvement in what it termed
the  ‘consistent  misappropriation  of  internationally-known  trademarks’  (software
piracy was alarmingly rife).352
From  1998-1999,  collusion  involving  pharmaceutical  companies  attempting  to
influence the  South  African  Health  Ministry  to  end  its  attempt  through the  1997
343 G Mills & J Stremlau The reality behind the rhetoric: The United States, South Africa and Africa. 
(2000) 7.
344 Saule note 258 16–17.
345 P Fabricius ‘U.S. South Africa relations: A view from both sides’ in US South Africa relations and 
the Pariah States. (1997) SAIIA Reports No 2 26.
346 Saule note 258 54.
347 Mills & Stremlau note 343 7.
348 Saule note 258 51.
349 P Bond The elite transition from apartheid to neoliberalism in South Africa (2000) 49.
350 Ibid. 48.
351 Ibid. 49.
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Medicines  Act  to  import  cheap  antiretroviral  (ARV)  HIV/AIDS  medicine  came  to
light.353 (See  the  Treatment  Action  Campaign (TAC)  case.354)  These  companies
wanted SA to license the ARVs locally as an alternative to relying on products of
multinational drug companies.355 This was described by the State Department in a
February 1999 report as a ‘full court press’ tactic against the sovereignty of South
African  medicines.356 Even  though  the  US  talked  of  supporting  the  newly
democratically liberated country, this act was a demonstration to SA of how the US
wielded international economic power.357 
Despite the above issues, the trade relationship between the US and SA became an
important  one  over  the  years  (with  the  inception  of  the  African  Growth  and
Opportunity Act (AGOA) in 2001), as total trade had almost doubled.358 With AGOA
already operational, the US attempted and failed to conclude a regional free trade
area  (FTA)  between  itself,  SA  and  the  neighbouring  Southern  African  Customs
Union (SACU) states as a result of rancour and resentment between the negotiating
parties  from  the  different  states.359 The  main  reason  these  negotiations  did  not
succeed was SACU’s  view that  the  US was inflexible  in  the  manner in  which it
approached negotiations. SACU was also concerned of the prospects about matters
including protection of intellectual property rights (drug and seed patents); technical
standards  and  data  management;  agricultural  subsidies;  and  government
procurement and investment.360 
Regardless,  trade  and  investment  between  SA  and  the  US  has  increased
significantly over the past two decades, with total trade including imports and exports
having grown from under $3.3 billion in 1985 to a staggering $16.8 billion in 2011. It
decreased to $12.7 billion in 2015 because at that time SA become a part of BRICS
(an acronym for the grouping of the world's leading emerging economies, namely
Brazil,  Russia,  India,  China  and  South  Africa),  and  China  became SA’s  biggest
trading partner, with the US coming in second.361 There has been a positive and
steady trade balance for most of this period, with exports not being limited to primary
commodities but also including agricultural and manufactured goods.362 In addition,
there was a delegation of American foreigners which visited SA between 1994 and
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2000 every three months, which indicated the high regard and robustness of the
relationship between the two countries.363
According  to  Fabricius,  the  relationship  between  the  two  countries  during  the
democratic dispensation has been led more by the US, which has defined how SA
interacts  with  its  other  trade  partners  in  the  Southern  African  Development
Community (SADC) and the SACU.364 In recent years this relationship has somewhat
become fractious  owing to  what  SA views as  the  US’  ‘heavy handedness in  its
attempts to gain further access to South African markets’,  as is evidenced in the
alleged  dumping  of  US  chicken  products,  which  has  led  to  considerable
consequences for the chicken farmers of SA.365 The cause of disagreement in these
circumstances  is  that  the  US is  pushing  for  a  more  reciprocal  trade  agreement
between the two countries as it believes SA is too developed to be benefiting still
from  the  AGOA  agreement.366 Another  reason  the  US  is  pushing  for  a  more
reciprocal trade agreement between these two countries is the success the EU has
had  in  concluding  and  mostly  implementing  numerous  European  Partnership
Agreements (EPAs) with other African countries with SA being one of them under
the Trade, Development and Cooperation Agreement (TDCA).367 However, there are
several trade and investment agreements between SA and the US, which include the
African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA) scheme; the Generalised System of
Preferences  (GSP);368 the  Trade,  Investment  and  Development  Cooperation
Agreement  (TIDCA)369 and  the  Trade  and  Investment  Framework  Agreement
(TIFA),370 but the most prominent of the four are the GSP and AGOA.371 
The  trade  relationship  between  these  two  countries  has  matured  since  1994,
enduring the expected ups and downs of any trade relationship which can at times
be accompanied by the occasional  scuffle,  but has overall  remained stable as a
result of agreement on issues such as trade and development.372 The relationship
between  SA  and  the  US  has  in  no  doubt  been  a  complicated  one  which  has
undergone  significant  changes  that  began  during  the  apartheid  government’s
363 Saule note 258 52.
364 Ibid. 53.
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367 Ibid.
368 Generalized System of Preferences — programmes by developed countries granting preferential 
tariffs to imports from developing countries. Available at 
https://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/glossary_e/gsp_e.htm, accessed on 21 September 2018.
369 Trade, Investment and Development Cooperation Agreement — a Cooperative Agreement to 
promote investment and expand and diversify trade. Available at https://www.tralac.org/resources/by-
region/sacu.html, accessed on 21 September 2018.
370 Trade and Investment Framework Agreements – function to provide strategic frameworks and 
principles for dialogue on trade and investment issues between the United States and the other 
contracting parties. Available at https://agoa.info/bilaterals/agreements.html, accessed on 
21 September 2018.
371 ‘SA-US trade relations – from chicken wars to Trump and beyond’ note 360.
372 Saule note 258 55.
42
regime, which turned somewhat sour after the passage of economic sanctions and
thereafter a return to a healthy relationship with the post-apartheid government.373 
3.5 Conclusion
Trade relations between SA and the US have been turbulent to say the very least.
What  has  been  demonstrated  above  is  the  complexity  that  this  relationship  has
endured over the past decades. The US has been an undoubted beneficiary as a
result of its influential position derived from its early involvement in barter and trade
in opposition to SA. It was during apartheid that the US gained a stronghold on the
South African economy, as demonstrated through the significant foreign investment
it  had  in  SA.  The  position  it  took  with  regard  to  sanctions  was  one  which  was
beneficial to it because of its vast financial resources in the South African economy.
This shows that the US is usually inclined to look after its interests above others’ in
most circumstances – even basic human rights. 
Trade  relations  with  the  US  are  always  mooted  as  being  beneficial  for
underdeveloped or least developed countries, the premise being that with its already
established position as a super power in the global order, it ought to assist other
nations  to  reach  similar  status.  With  this,  however,  comes  a  point  where
independence  and  development  for  many  of  these  previously  least  developed
countries becomes a necessity that can no longer be ignored. This would see the US
lose its influential position in institutions and organisations that govern global affairs.
Other nations would not be as reliant on the relationship and ties with the US as they
would  have  been  previously.  With  a  potential  significant  decrease  in  economic
power, influence and status, the manner in which the US has already conducted
itself through history would suggest that such a scenario would result in heightened
tension. Therefore, it is difficult to see the US supporting other nations in an attempt
to see to the development of less developed countries. 
This chapter has taken a look at the historic relations between the US and SA with a
closer look at the activity during one of the most strenuous periods in modern history
where moral values ought to have persevered – apartheid – but to no avail. There is
a contrast between the two periods under which these countries have sustained their
relations: apartheid and democracy.
The  results  of  apartheid  and  their  effects  on  trade  have  been  touched  on,  in
particular sanctions imposed against SA as a result of its apartheid activities; as well
as the results of the various responses of the allies of the apartheid government all
over the world. This chapter serves as the foundation for the discussion of AGOA
which takes place in the following chapter and will further illustrate the role of the US
in trade relations with Africa and SA.
373 Ibid. 14.
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CHAPTER FOUR: 
THE AGOA AND THE OVERALL IMPLICATIONS 
IN RELATION TO AFRICAN COUNTRIES
4.1 Introduction
The African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA) has been a part of trade relations
between  the  US  and  African  countries  since  its  enactment  in  2000374 and  its
emergence  has  to  a  certain  extent  contributed  to  ties  between  these  very
economically  different  countries.  This  relationship came at  a time when the 20th
century was coming to an end and most countries were looking to set the tone for
the new millennium. There were quite a few significant revolutionary events that took
place  on  the  African  continent  during  the  1900s;  for  instance,  several  African
countries gained independence from colonial rule in the 1960s.375 African countries
seemed to be awakening from a long slumber as SA also unshackled itself from the
apartheid regime only in 1994. 
At  international  forums such as the United Nations (UN) and during the General
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) negotiations, African countries were voicing
their concerns over their lack of development and the difficult  economic positions
they  found  themselves  in,  especially  in  relation  to  trade.  It  was  only  fitting  that
historically  ‘developed’  countries  would  acknowledge  these  concerns  and  act
accordingly as perceived leaders. There was a formulation of agreements (GATT)
and the  creation  of  institutions  (such  as  the  WTO)  that  were  intended  to  assist
‘developing’ countries to overcome the challenges with which they were faced, but
also included developed countries as part of the solution. The irony here is that help
was  being  sought  from  the  same  places  from  where,  it  can  be  argued,  the
challenges  indirectly  originated.  Developed  countries  set  the  tone  for  what  is
considered  acceptable  and  have  portrayed  themselves  as  leaders  and  pioneers
since the beginning of time.
The AGOA is another example of a ‘developed’ country portraying itself in the guise
of a saviour attempting to assist lesser developed countries, which perpetuates this
narrative. This chapter will focus on certain aspects in relation to this Act in order to
determine to what extent it has influenced trade relations between SA and the US.
This will include the background to the formulation of the AGOA agreement and what
its relationship is to Africa as a whole and then specifically to SA. This will be done
through an analysis of cases and events in relation to this Act to gauge what impact
it  has  had  on  all  parties  involved.  This  chapter  will  discuss  these  aspects  by
discussing the background of the AGOA, the initiation of the Act and what motivated
its promulgation. This will also include the purpose, participants and benefits derived
374 The African Growth and Opportunity Act, 2000 note 2.
375 1960: The Year of Independence. Available at https://www.france24.com/en/20100214-1960-year-
independence, accessed on 17 December 2018.
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from  the  Act.  Thereafter,  AGOA  and  its  effects  on  Africa  will  be  analysed  by
examining various aspects by means of which this Act has affected and influenced
as well as benefited the African continent as a whole.
4.2 Background to AGOA
On a wider spectrum, the formulation of AGOA was borne out of necessity for the US
as opposed to assisting with the economic growth and development of the African
continent. The latter benefits came as a sort of ‘selling point’ to persuade countries to
open their  markets to the US.376 African countries, on the other hand, were also
interested in establishing an alternative trade partner from their colonially established
European ties, who had been dominating trade on the continent and for the most
part had been in control of the African market for raw materials for centuries at that
point.377 Furthermore, the US was seeking to establish itself as a prominent country
on  many  fronts,  with  trade  being  one  of  them.  Such  circumstances  created  the
perfect  opportunity  for  the  US  to  formulate  a  strategy  to  infiltrate  the  African
continent.378 The platform to engage on AGOA was at the US Congress, where the
initiation, discussions and debates took place to determine the benefits and potential
drawbacks of enacting legislation of this nature.
With the end of apartheid in SA, the US sought to strike the iron while it was hot and
actively sought to increase economic relations with surrounding sub-Saharan African
(SSA) countries.379 Substantial efforts were made by the former President Bill Clinton
to signify intent of building relations with SSA countries, especially SA. In 1994, the
year SA held its first democratic elections, an aid and investment package worth
$600 million was announced.380 What followed in 1995 was the creation of a bill that
was debated for no less than five years and would later become the AGOA found
under  Title  II  of  Trade  and  Development.381 The  motivation  behind  this  bill  was
improving relations with the African continent by making use of the Uruguay Round
(UR)-styled multilateral trade agreements.382 In 1997 there was a proposal for there
to be a Partnership for Economic Growth and Opportunity in Africa, which offered
different types of economic benefits to SSA countries, depending on their economic
reform measures – which was a signal of things to come.383 
In actual fact, there were several attempts that eventually resulted in the creation of
AGOA. The initial steps in its creation was a series of reports compiled by President
376 R McCormick McCormick, R ‘The African Growth and Opportunity Act: The perils of pursuing 
African development through U.S. trade law’ (2006) Texas International Law Journal 341.
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Clinton’s administration as directed by Congress on a strategy of how to penetrate
African  markets.384 The  responses  were  not  received  well  by  Congress,  which
argued that these were a ‘compilation of existing policy’ that did not address the debt
burden that was faced by Africa at the time.385 Thereafter, members of Congress
formed a caucus that was to review and revisit the policies suggested by President
Clinton. They came up with a bill called the African Growth and Opportunity: The End
of  Dependency  Act.386 The  matter  was  not  deliberated  on  again  until  the
administration submitted a further report in February 1997 which again was criticised
for  not  having  clear  implementation  strategies  and was further  revised later  that
year.387 Eventually parties that were advocating for African trade preferences as well
as those seeking to protect domestic industries threatened by the purported import of
African ‘goods’ came to a compromise, which resulted in the AGOA.388
The AGOA is  a  unilateral,  non-reciprocal  trade  preference  programme providing
duty-free treatment for imports of certain goods from eligible sub-Saharan African
countries to the US.389 It was signed into law by President Bill Clinton on 18 May
2000, with various subsequent amendments thereafter.390 It was initially intended to
be operational for a period of between eight and nine years, starting from 1 October
2000 to the end of September in 2009. However, it is still operational to this day. 391
This is due to former President George W Bush’s signing of the AGOA Acceleration
Act  of  2004,  popularly  known  as  AGOA III,  which  extended  its  operation  to  30
September 2015, having come into effect on 8 July 2004.392 This was the second
time that an extension had taken place, with the first one having occurred in 2002.393
The intention was to increase market access even further than had initially been
intended in the original agreement.394 In 2006, there was a further amendment to
AGOA which was to extend provisions concerning textile and apparel imports to the
year 2012.395 AGOA was due to be renegotiated and reauthorized in 2015 as it was
due to expire as per the provisions under section 7 of AGOA III.396 This took place
and after a lengthy process SA was eventually included as a beneficiary once more
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after  it  had  made some concessions with  relation  to  AD duties  imposed  on  US
poultry imports.397
4.2.1 Purpose of AGOA
AGOA has three standout  features,  namely,  the way in  which it  benefits  African
countries;  the  positive  effect  it  has  on  US business;  and  the  conditions  set  for
eligibility in order to enjoy the benefits.398 However, the purported and stated main
purpose  of  AGOA  is  to  ‘enhance  economic  growth  and  development  in  SSA
countries with the intention of deepening US trade and investment ties’.399 This is
intended to be achieved through the liberalising of trade between Africa and the
US.400 The rationale of the underlying principles was that the elimination of barriers
would result in unrestricted trade and investment into SSA countries which in turn
would result in strong private sector development that would in turn create economic
opportunities for Africans.401 Up until  its enactment, the US mainly utilised its Aid
program in  assisting  poor  African countries.402 The underlying  target  –  economic
growth – is a prevalent feature of unilateral trade agreements,403 as these types of
agreements are usually established between developed and developing countries.404 
As  such,  section  103  sets  out  the  objectives  which  AGOA  intends  the  US and
participant countries to achieve. These are:
‘1. Encourage increased trade and investment between the US and SSA;
2. Reduce tariff  and non-tariff  barriers and other obstacles to SSA and US
trade;
3. Expand US assistance to SSA regional integration efforts;
4. Negotiate reciprocal  and mutually  beneficial  trade agreements,  including
the possibility of establishing free trade areas that serve the interest of both
the US and the countries of SSA;
5. Focus on countries committed to the rule of law, economic reform, and the
eradication of poverty;
6. Strengthen and expand the private sector in SSA, especially enterprises
owned by women and small business;
397 F Ismail ‘The AGOA Extension and Enhancement Act of 2015, the SA-US AGOA negotiations and 
the future of AGOA’ (2017) 16(3) World Trade Review 535.
398 A Gerstenfeld & R J Njoroge ‘African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA)’ (2002) Department of 
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7. Facilitate the development of civil societies and political freedom in SSA;
8. Establish a US-SSA Trade and Economic Forum; and
9. Accession  of  the  countries  of  SSA  to  the  Organisation  for  Economic
Cooperation and Development (OECD), Convention on Combating Bribery
of Foreign Public Officials in International Business Transactions.’405
The strategy that was adopted by the US government is that the AGOA would be
focused on expanding trade, economic growth and free markets through creating
stable  economies  and  democratically  operative  governments  in  Africa.406
Additionally, with the US far more experienced and developed on aspects relating to
trade, it  could offer support and expertise which ideally would open a channel of
communication between the US and the African continent that could address trade,
investment and policy concerns that might arise.407 An interesting point to note is that
another  reason for  AGOA’s existence was to  balance out  the share of  countries
trading  with  the  Europeans  through  the  Cotonou  Partnership  Agreement  (CPA)
which  included  African,  Caribbean  and  Pacific  (ACP)  countries  (see  Annexure
One)408 and was based on preferential trade.409 
Compliance  with  AGOA  is  measured  through  continuous  monitoring  by  the  US,
through its sitting President,410 who can review whether a country is making progress
in  meeting  the  abovementioned  requirements.411 One  of  the  earlier  reviews  was
carried  out  by  former  President  George  W Bush  on  31  December  2001,  where
35 countries  were  certified.412 Reviews  can  be  initiated  at  any  time  during  the
subsistence of the agreement and can also be brought about through a petition413 by
any interested person.414 This is done to ensure that countries are continuously  au
fait with AGOA’s eligibility conditions. Essentially, if the president determines that the
requirements are not being met by a particular country, he then has to issue a 60-
day notice and thereafter make a decision based on the review.415 ‘This decision will
either be to terminate the designation of the country as a beneficiary, or to withdraw,
suspend,  or  limit  the  application  of  duty-free  treatment  with  regard  to  eligible
products from said country.’416 
4.2.2 Participants
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There are currently 39 eligible SSA countries.417 Eligibility is granted through an SSA
country being an existing beneficiary of  the US General  Scheme of  Preferences
(GSP418).419 To qualify as an eligible country,  there must be compliance with and
satisfaction  of  certain  essential  requirements.  Economically,  included  is  the
establishing of a market-based economy, a rules-based trading system, and  US
trade  and  investment  borders  being  eliminated  and  the  protection  of  intellectual
property.420 Among the non-economic purposes are adherence to the rule of law,
political  pluralism,  the  promotion  of  democracy  and  stability,  labour  rights  and
respect  for  basic  human rights.421 These  are  explained  in  far  more  detail  under
section 104422 of the AGOA.423
The US annually determines which countries have met the eligibility requirements.
Beneficiary  countries  have  no  recourse  for  dispute  settlement,  which  essentially
means the US dictates terms to member countries.424 This list is ever-changing as
review  processes  are  conducted  by  the  US President  and  countries  have  been
barred at times from the scheme for allegedly not making the desired progress or
violating the required eligibility criteria.425 The US has stayed true to form in relation
to its power-wielding abilities as through the years several other countries have lost
their AGOA status.426 
Initially there were 34 SSA countries that received trade benefits427 under AGOA.
Thereafter other countries trickled through slowly as Swaziland joined on 18 January
2001 as the 35th country, the Ivory Coast became the 36th on 16 May 2002 (they
had lost their status and regained it) and Gambia joined along with the Democratic
Republic  of  Congo  (DRC)  on  1  January  2003.428 The  Seychelles  have  since
417 The 39 AGOA eligible SSA countries are: Angola, Benin, Botswana, Burkina Faso, Burundi, 
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graduated from AGOA as they have reached the status of a developing country. 429
Countries  were  identified  through  social  monitoring  research  that  evaluated
predetermined criteria that have been mentioned earlier in this chapter.430 Eligibility
was  determined  through  the  research  of  data,  such  as  per  capita  income  and
consultations with the US embassy with other stakeholders, to gauge the levels of
corruption and human rights violations among potential participants.431
4.2.3 Benefits
As mentioned above, from the onset the crux of this Act has been that in order to be
eligible and qualify for benefits, a country ought to meet certain requirements. In this
respect, AGOA offers incentives that encourage participation from member countries
by reinforcing reform efforts on the African continent; make available the technical
and credit expertise of the US; and allows dialogue regarding trade and investment
between the US and the Africa.432 It  also provides duty-free access, and in some
cases  tariff-  and  quota-free  access  to  the  US  markets.433 What  is  supposedly
beneficial from an African country’s perspective are incentives that encourage the
continued liberalising of African economies and building free markets focused on
trade rather  than financial  aid.434 From the US point  of  view,  AGOA enables  an
increase in market opportunities and formations of new commercial partnerships as
well as the privatisation of African state-owned companies (SOEs) and infrastructure
projects.435 The creation of this agreement saw the US alter its Harmonized Tariff
Schedule (HTS) to accommodate apparel and textile trade preferences that were
provided for under section 112.436 In 2008, the HTS stood at 10 500 individual tariff
lines for US imports with only 3 800 not having the Most Favoured Nation (MFN)
tariff.437 
Among further benefits are duty-free access for most goods that are exported to the
US from eligible countries.438 This coverage is for additional commodities included as
part  of  those  covered  under  the  GSP.439 Duty-free  treatment  is  extended  under
AGOA to certain apparel and footwear products not eligible to qualify for it under
GSP, including LDCs.440 As mentioned earlier, another benefit derived from the Act is
the  GSP,  which  is  a  ‘US  trade-preference  programme that  applies  to  over  120
429 Ibid.
430 Gerstenfeld & R J Njoroge note 398 8.
431 Ibid. 9.
432 Gerstenfeld & R J Njoroge note 398 7.
433 Duty refers to taxes levied on imported or exported goods. On the other hand, tariff refers to ‘import
duties’ charged at the time goods are imported. Benefits have been awarded to as many as 
41 countries since the inception of the AGOA in 2000. ‘AGOA Country Eligibility’ note 428.
434 Tigere note 391 1.
435 Gerstenfeld & R J Njoroge note 398 7.
436 Obua note 378 69.
437 BR Williams ‘African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA): Background and Reauthorization’ 
Congressional Research Service (2014) 3.
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440 Williams note 437 3.
51
developing countries.’441 Under the new Act,442 GSP coverage was extended to 2015,
which ensured that later preferences did not replace tariff  preferences which had
expired under the initial GSP.443 Interestingly, the GSP in general removes tariffs on
3 400 products but significantly more (4 800) for least developed countries (LDCs).444
Under the reauthorised agreement, approximately 6 800 tariff lines are offered under
the preferential programme.445 Further, AGOA covers 1 800 tariff lines beyond the
GSP,446 and overall in 2017, these tariff lines total approximately 6 800.447 However,
what is fundamental to AGOA are tariff benefits from where duty-free access comes
from.448 The  AGOA’s  tariff  benefits  include  all  GSP-covered  products  and  other
additional products determined by the sitting US President as not being sensitive to
imports  relating to  SSA products.449 Moreover,  90 percent  of  AGOA benefits  are
already  tariff  free  under  the  GSP  when  imported  from  qualifying  LDCs,450 and
beneficiaries are exempt from caps allowed on imports that are duty-free under the
GSP.451 
Textiles and Apparel are sectors that are heavily focused on by AGOA owing to their
emergence and potential in Africa. They are therefore the primary consideration for
trade benefits.452 Textile benefits are considered to be the most prominent benefits
under AGOA because they are more selective than general AGOA criteria and are
available to only a few members.453 However, these benefits are subject to the Rule
of Origins (ROO) provisions which are protectionist in nature because they allow only
25  percent  of  foreign  materials  to  be  eligible  for  duty-free  access.454 ROO was
intended to help manufacturers of eligible African countries to use more of their local
and regional fabrics.455 Textiles were the second largest non-oil beneficiary in 2014
with trade valued at $1 billion, and in terms of non-oil exports were surpassed only
by  the  export  of  motor  vehicles,  and  became  for  many  countries  their  largest
manufacturing export.456 SA is a non-LDC apparel producer and because of this a
stricter ‘yarn forward’ ROO applies, where the yarn or fabric has to be produced
either in an AGOA beneficiary country or the US for the overall garment to qualify for
benefits.457Apparel products are considered to have economic significance to LDCs
because special provisions are granted in respect of these under the Third Country
441 Ibid. 1.
442 The AGOA Acceleration Act of 2004 of the 108th Congress of the United States of America.
443 Zappile note 404 50.
444 Williams note 437 3.
445 Ismail note 397 529.
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447447 Ismail note 397 529.
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449 Ibid. 3.
450 McCormick note 376 365.
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452 L Paez S Karingi M Kimenyi & M Paulos ‘A Decade (2000-2010) of African-U.S. Trade under the 
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455 Naumann note 1 14.
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Fabric Provision (TCFP).458 These have been extended on three occasions, first to
2008, then to 2012, and after that to 2015, with a further extension granted for a
further  10 years  to  2025.459 Not  all  beneficiaries  of  AGOA are eligible  to  receive
benefits under the provisions made for apparel.460 There is a further condition placed
on countries which is that they can ‘graduate’ on economic development criteria such
as having a threshold of US$1 500 Gross National Product (GNP) per capita which
countries including Gabon, Mauritius, Seychelles and SA possess.461 They therefore
cannot benefit from the Special Rule for Apparel under AGOA.462 Apparel has the
most diversified exports because the majority of countries who use AGOA benefit
when compared to other sectors. In 2014 there were ten countries which were able
to export $1 million in exports each among themselves.463 In order to be eligible for
duty-free treatment for apparel, a country has to adopt and implement a visa-tracking
system that prevents unlawful transhipments.464 Also, enforcement and verification
procedures for  customs controls  must  be  instituted.465 The standards of  the  visa
system are established by the US Customs Service.466
What is considered as apparel that ought to receive benefits for duty-free treatment
includes:
 Apparel assembled in one or more AGOA beneficiary countries from US
yarn and fabric;
 Apparel made of SSA (regional) yarns and fabrics, which was subject to a
cap until 2015;
 Apparel  made  in  a  designated  LDC of  third-country  yarns  and  fabrics,
which was subject to a cap until 2015;
 Apparel made of yarns and fabrics not produced in commercial quantities in
the  US (determination must  be made that  the  yarn  or  fabric  cannot  be
supplied by the US industry in a timely manner, and to extend preferential
treatment to the eligible fabric);
 Certain cashmere and merino wool sweaters; and 
457 GA Pigman ‘AGOA IV and the future of US-Africa Trade Relations’ (2016) Commonwealth Hot 
Topics, Issue 127, March 2016. Available at http://www.thecommonwealth-ilibrary.org/commonwealth/
imprints/2016, accessed on 4 December 2018.
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 Certain handloomed, handmade, ethnic printed fabrics, or folklore articles
(certain countries only).467
In this respect, a 2014 US Congressional report stated that the overall total for US
apparel exports from Africa is less than $1 billion, compared to $30.7 billion from
China and $9.2 billion from Vietnam.468 It would appear that reviews on benefits and
how countries have made use of them is mixed, because there are industries which
report  significant  growth  in  numbers,  while  for  others  there  is  still  room  for
improvement. Countries such as Kenya are intending to focus on other areas within
their economies which can help them derive more of the benefits that are offered by
AGOA.469 This will see the Act further entrenched within Africa.
4.3 General operation of the AGOA in Africa
In the opinion of US officials, AGOA has encouraged investment and job creation in
Africa.470 However,  after  six  years  into  operation,  there  was  no  consensus  on
whether  AGOA had contributed  to  African  development  and  economic  growth.471
Although there are some African countries472 that have been able to attract foreign
investment  while  increasing  production  and  exports,  most  have  not  been  as
successful.473 For instance, the provisions enshrined under section 104 are arbitrary
to African countries because they require submissiveness to the US, in addition to
challenges474 arising  from implementing WTO agreements.475 As  a  result,  African
governments  have  abandoned  social  safety  nets  through  cutting  down  on  basic
social services and the reduction of domestic food production.476
However, case studies show that the textile industries of Kenya and Lesotho have
derived benefits from these industries and form a part of AGOA which has affected
trade positively in these countries.477 With the beginning of AGOA, trade between the
US and Kenya saw an upswing in trade activity. However, soon thereafter, with the
expiry of the Multifibre Agreement (MFA),478 there was a downturn.479 Kenya’s largest
trade concentration under AGOA is apparel, with fresh fruits and nuts and cut flowers
467 Department of Commerce, Office of Textiles and Apparel (OTEXA) Summary of AGOA textile and 
apparel provisions at OTEXA. Available at http://otexa.ita.doc.gov, accessed on 17 December 2018.
468 B Williams ‘African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA): Background and Reauthorization’, 
Congressional Research Service, 22 April 2015. (2015) 9.
469 Kenya looks beyond apparel to double earnings from AGOA. Available at  
https://agoa.info/news/article/15528-kenya-looks-beyond-apparel-to-double-earnings-from-agoa.html 
accessed on 17 October 2018.
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472 South Africa, Kenya, Lesotho, Ghana, Mauritius, Namibia, Ethiopia, and Cameroon.
473 Ismail note 397 530.
474 High tariffs on selected products (‘tariff peaks’) in important markets that continue to obstruct their 
important exports. Examples include tariff peaks on textiles, clothing, and fish and fish products and 
tariff escalation where an importing country protects its processing or manufacturing industry by 
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making  up  the  rest  of  the  total.480 Of  late,  Kenya  is  looking  beyond  apparel  to
increase its earnings under AGOA and will attempt to boost processed food, coffee
and tea exports to achieve this.481 
Lesotho  was  producing  apparel  in  great  numbers  in  February  2006,  when  over
two million pairs of jeans and six million knitted garments were being exported for US
brands and retailers,482 with growth having been between $50 million dollars in 1996
to $456 million in  2004,  generated through apparel  workers.483 Lesotho has also
seen significant job growth in the economic sector as a result of duty-free treatment,
with jobs increasing from 19 000 in 1999 to 45 700 in June 2011.484 Furthermore, in
2013, countries such as Kenya, Lesotho, Ghana, Mauritius, Namibia, Ethiopia and
Cameroon had exports exceeding the $100 million threshold of apparel, which made
up less than 1 percent of the total US imports.485 
African countries receive funding from the US Agency for International Development
(USAID) and the Millennium Challenge Corporation fund (MCC).486 The MCC assists
the USAID by creating the African Competitiveness and Trade Expansion (ACTE)
and with its annual budget of $30 million has created three African Trade Hubs in
Ghana, Kenya and Botswana intended to  help support  capacity  building towards
AGOA  beneficiaries’  exports  into  the  US.487 Earlier  in  the  negotiations  for
reauthorisation there was an introduction by Senators Jim Inhofe and Chris Coons of
the African Free Trade Initiative Act which would work in conjunction with the MCC
and USAID to  implement  objectives  set  by  the  president  under  the  FTA,  which
included  a  mechanism  of  how  to  negotiate  and  enter  into  FTAs  with  SSA
countries.488 Thus far  a  list  has been compiled as instructed by Congress which
includes countries that would be interested in the formation of a FTA; however, there
continue to be reminders of the failed attempt with SACU in 2003.489 
478 This was a framework for bilateral agreements or unilateral actions that established quotas limiting 
imports into countries whose domestic industries were facing serious damage from rapidly increasing 
imports.
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Even though under AGOA there are extensive rights and benefits to multinational
corporations operating in the African continent, there is no guarantee that workers
and  businesses  will  benefit  from  expanded  trade,  with  no  protection  for  the
environment  either.490 Further  areas  for  concern  are  that  there  is  no  technology
sharing between participants and the US. There is a relationship of give-and-take
where the US decides what it deems to be suitable to give or share, which leaves
potential for the exploitation of African countries.491 
4.4 AGOA and South Africa
South Africa, a developing African country, is arguably the largest exporter of various
products to the US, especially those falling under the non-oil category.492 This had
helped SA to increase its exports in high-value growth sectors in the SA economy.
These  include  automobiles,  chemicals  and  agricultural  products,  which  include
citrus, macadamia nuts and wine.493 A little over 10 years ago SA was responsible for
more than half of the US imports from eligible countries.494 There was a trade surplus
of over $2.7 billion, with exports from the US to SA exceeding those of any other
country, which indicated the interest of gaining access to the market in SA.495 The
most significant exports under AGOA from SA are gold, silver and precious metals.496
However, things have somewhat changed since SA’s exports mostly consisted of
minerals  and  metals,  with  no  agricultural  products  exceeding  the  R100  million
threshold.497 In 2004 SA accounted for 18 percent of agricultural export produce from
the whole African continent.498 Further, the main agricultural exports to the US for the
year 2014 were oranges, wine and macadamia nuts to the values of $41, $33 and
$31.8 million respectively.499 This is a long way to come from the time when the US
put in place high MFN tariffs in order to suffocate agricultural imports from SA.500
Since the year 2000 and up until 2014, SA was able to double the value of exports to
the US. These reached $8.27 billion, of which 40 percent were listed as beneficiaries
under AGOA and the GSP preferences.501 According to Carim, approximately 62 395
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jobs were created directly or indirectly from AGOA, and it thus plays a critical role in
South African jobs and its objective to industrialise further.502 SA has been able to
utilise AGOA effectively and is one of the few beneficiaries which have managed to
diversify exports to the US.503 A huge contributing factor to this is that SA enjoys a
special advantage over a majority of the goods that are covered in AGOA. 504 Also,
SA  is  the  first  country  to  undergo  a  special  out-of-cycle  review  because  of  the
concern  that  was  raised  in  relation  to  eligibility  requirements  provided  for  under
section  104(A)  of  AGOA.  This  was partially  a  result  of  the  AD duties  that  were
imposed by SA on US poultry  products intended for  SA.505 This  was specifically
provided for under subsection 3(E) titled ‘Sense of Congress’, which led to the out-
of-cycle review.506 
It was suggested as recently as September 2015 by the US Congress that SA has a
large and well-developed economy and should therefore graduate from being under
the AGOA.507 This was a view suggested during the reauthorisation negotiations by
African  trade  expert  Whitney  Schneidman,  who  went  as  far  as  suggesting  a
reciprocal trade agreement should be preferred instead.508 This was partially due to
the fact that in 2013, with the exception of the oil exports, SA had the largest exports
to the US, which amounted to $8.1 billion, with AGOA being responsible for $3.1
billion including GSP.509 Another contributor to this notion held by the US is the trade
relationship SA has with the EU through the Trade and Development Cooperation
Agreement,  where  SA  reduced  its  tariffs  vis-à-vis the  EU.510 Furthermore,  SA’s
relationship with BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China, South Africa) nations may also
have contributed to the recent actions of the US. The US was of the opinion that it
has  the  right  to  request  terms  that  are  favourable  to  it  because  the  European
Preference Agreements (EPAs) that African countries have entered into are similar
to what it is seeking, and it has submitted a list of 387 products’ tariff lines where it
feels the EU has the upper hand.511 
Furthermore,  AGOA identifies several  industries  which  include natural  resources,
automotive,  chemical  and agricultural  products.512 SA is  considered as a middle-
income market  with  ‘well-developed financial,  legal,  communications,  energy and
transport sectors and  a stock exchange that is the 15th largest in the world’. 513 In
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2003 the South African automobile industry was thriving under AGOA as it increased
sixteen-fold  with  the  creation  of  15 000  jobs.514 Other  industries  are  cosmetics,
plastics, textiles, trucks and agricultural machinery where the US faces a threat in
goods from the EU that are found in SA’s markets.515 
The different sectors of SA’s industries are divided into portions the size of which is
determined by their Gross Domestic Product (GDP). They are as follow: 
 The mining  sector  employs  a  greater  number  of  workers  than all  other
sectors and is the 5th largest contributor to the GDP.516
 The manufacturing sector makes up 14 percent of the GDP and is the 4th-
largest contributor to the economy. Goods produced consist of processed
food,  textiles,  electronics,  chemicals,  technology,  and  automobiles.
Automobiles make up 12 percent of this sector and contribute 6,7 percent
to  the  GDP.  29  percent  of  manufacturing  companies  produce  for  the
automobile industry while also being responsible for 84 percent of all motor
vehicles produced in Africa.  The sector  produces both parts  as well  as
completed  motors  cars,  while  employing  300 000  people.  Cars  are  the
second most exported products making up 7.6 percent of all products at
$5.23 billion. 517 
 The export economy is the 33rd largest in the world with the US being the
second largest export  destination, with totals reaching $5.47 billion. The
largest  export  category  is  mineral  products  at  $14  billion,  with  refined
petroleum consisting of 2.4 percent of all exports at $1.65 billion.  518
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4.5 Recent issues involving South Africa and the United States
As with every interaction involving countries and the exchange of goods, or relations
between  them  or  even  diplomacy,  there  are  bound  to  be  disagreements.  The
reauthorisation of the AGOA saw the resurgence of matters which appeared to have
been dealt with – such as the chicken dispute.519 These and other issues are either a
result  of  AGOA  or  are  initiated  due  to  the  effect  that  they  might  have  on  the
agreement in the long run. In particular, these issues involved, the chicken AD (anti-
dumping)  duties  (as  mentioned  above),  the  new steel  provisions  and  aluminium
provisions as well as the recent expropriation of land without compensation motion
which was passed as a resolution at a recent 54th African National Congress (ANC)
National Conference which was held at Nasrec Expo Centre in December 2017.520 
First, the poultry dispute between SA and the US stretches back to the inception of
AGOA  with  the  then  Board  on  Tariffs  and  Trade  (BTT),521 now  known  as  the
International Trade Administration Commission of South Africa (ITAC),522 imposing
anti-dumping duties on poultry  products from the US.523 This was the result  of  a
petition filed by the South African Customs Union (SACU)524 representing the poultry
industries of these countries on their behalf by Rainbow Farms (Pty) Ltd.525 There
was an allegation that there was a dumping of ‘brown meat’526 and that it was being
sold below the US market price.527 There was an investigation initiated by the BTT
where US poultry exporters Tyson Foods, Boston Agrex and Gold Kist were invited
to  decipher  the  provided  information  and  a  preliminary  determination  found  that
dumping had indeed taken place and therefore preliminary AD duties were imposed
on the US.528 
This,  in retrospect,  is responsible for the tension between SA and the US which
recently  arose  during  the  renegotiation  and  reauthorisation  of  AGOA.529 The
argument  raised  by  Senators  Coon  from  Delaware  and  Isaakson  from  Georgia
519 The US had for the duration of the AGOA agreement complied with the AD duties imposed on 
them regarding chicken exports to SA, however the reauthorization negotiations saw this issue being 
raised again as non-compliance with provisions of the Act.
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respectively was that SA was benefiting from AGOA and maintaining trade barriers
(AD) against US imports.530 Because of these contentions, SA was included under
strict terms,531 subject to a special review.532 The review came to the conclusion that
SA was in breach of the eligibility requirements and had to remove the AD duties
before January 2015 or suffer the consequences of losing preferential tariff rates on
eligible agricultural products. This subsequently was the case and the products were
suspended from 15 March 2015.533 What is interesting to note here are the methods
used by the US not to make use of the WTO’s dispute settlement mechanism and to
wait instead until the renegotiations for reauthorisation to raise this issue.534 This was
followed by renegotiations where an agreement was reached that there would be: 
‘1. an annual  import  quota  for  US in  bone chicken to the scale  of  65000  metric
tonnes;
2. an annual growth factor as determined by the Department of Agriculture, Forests
and Fisheries (DAFF) to be applied to the above quota with effect from 1 April
2017;
3. termination  or  suspension of  the import  quota in  the event  that  South Africa’s
benefits under AGOA are suspended’.535
Recently, the South African Poultry Association (SAPA) filed an application with the
Gauteng Division of the High Court of SA seeking the granting of an order whereby
the Minister  of  Trade and Industry,  Rob Davies,  was instructed to  set  aside the
implementation  of  the  AGOA  because  of  the  steel  and  aluminium  proclamation
imposed  by  President  Trump.536 The  Minister  opposed  the  application.  SAPA is
seeking  for  AD  that  were  initially  implemented  the  first  time  AGOA  was  being
negotiated to be reinstated and to end the special quota of 65 000 tonnes of bone-in
chicken being imported into SA.537 If the application were to be successful it would
see a disruption in the operation of AGOA because it is a package deal, and benefits
received by other industries will be affected. It is interesting to note that no other
industry  is  supporting  this  application,  especially  SA’s  steel  and  aluminium
exporters.538 
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In  2014  iron  and  steel  products  were  the  second  largest  exports  under  AGOA,
making up 16.5 percent of all non-oil exports where 99 percent of exports under this
category in AGOA are attributed to SA.539 Exports  to  the US of  this  product  are
responsible for less than 1 percent of total US imports and 0.3 percent of total US
steel  demand. 540 Although minute  in  the  grand scheme of  things,  these exports
account for 5 percent of SA’s overall production which is the equivalent of 7500 jobs
in the steel value chain.541
On  8  March  2018,  US  President  Donald  Trump  issued  two  presidential
proclamations applicable indefinitely to special duties at levels of 25 and 10 percent
respectively on imports of different steels and aluminium to the US, which began on
23 March 2018.542 The reason is said to be an attempt at supporting the domestic
steel and aluminium manufacturing sectors by encouraging them to make use of
available production lines to revitalise and sustain their operation in order to ensure
greater long-term sustainability, which in turn would serve US security.543 The US
President signed a proclamation that granted exemptions to certain countries544 until
1 June 2018.545 SA attempted to apply for an exemption as well but was denied this
after making representations to the US.546
As it stands, it appears that SA is the only country that benefits under AGOA that is
exporting products that are covered under the proclamation. These proclamations
override preferences offered under  AGOA and no beneficiaries are exempt.547 In
2017 there was no preferential access claimed by products and therefore no direct
impact on AGOA. As such, SA still  exported $278 million worth of steel products
covered under the standard MFN market access.548 However, under aluminium, SA
exported $378 million worth in products to the US, with $153 million worth of exports
obtaining AGOA preferences.549 President Trump has stated that this decision is not
539 Naumann note 1 11.
540 Ibid.
541 South Africa's Minister Davies: Steel and aluminium exports to US no threat to national security, 
15 July 2018. Available at https://agoa.info/news/article/15486-sa-minister-davies-steel-and-
aluminium-exports-to-us-no-threat-to-national-security.html accessed on 17 October 2018. 
542 E Naumann ‘Trump’s steel and aluminium tariff action: Putting America first?’ 7 May 2018. 
Available at https://www.tralac.org/publications/article/13008-trump-s-steel-and-aluminium-tariff-
action-putting-america-first.html, accessed on 17 October 2018.
543 Ibid.
544 The European Union, Mexico, South Korea, Australia, Argentina, Brazil and Canada.
545 L Omarjee ‘SA loses out on Trump’s steel tariff exemption’. Available at  
https://www.fin24.com/Economy/sa-loses-out-on-trumps-steel-tariff-exemption-20180501 accessed on
4 December 2018.
546 P Fabricius ‘Act of Retaliation: Trump rejects SA’s appeal for exemptions to high steel and 
aluminium import tariffs’. Available at 
https://www.dailymaverick.co.za/article/2018-05-02-trump-rejects-sas-appeal-for-exemptions-to-high-
steel-and-aluminium-import-tariffs/, accessed on 4 December 2018.
547 Infographic. Available at https://www.tralac.org/publications/article/13008-trump-s-steel-and-
aluminium-tariff-action-putting-america-first.html accessed on 17 October 2018.
548 Infographic. Available at https://www.tralac.org/publications/article/13008-trump-s-steel-and-
aluminium-tariff-action-putting-america-first.html accessed on 17 October 2018.
549 Infographic. Available at https://www.tralac.org/publications/article/13008-trump-s-steel-and-
aluminium-tariff-action-putting-america-first.html accessed on 17 October 2018. 
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in any way linked to AGOA but instead is about protecting the United States’ national
security and their interest as well as position in global trade.550
The last contentious issue between the countries involve the recent decision on land
expropriation. In this respect, Minister Davies has stated that the US does not plan to
strip SA of any benefits in the event that it implements expropriation of land without
compensation.551 Trade  union  Solidarity,  however,  believe  differently,  in  that  the
resolution of the ruling party,  the ANC, to expropriate land without compensation
could result in a loss of these benefits.552 Other experts such as senior analyst on the
political economy at Tutwa Consulting Group, Azwimpheleli Langalanga, emphasise
that this is unlikely to take place because it did not threaten the national interests of
US.553 This matter is a fairly recent issue, having been ratified as a resolution as
recently as December 2017.554 Despite the limited academic analysis in relation to
this matter, commercial industries such as the law firm, Herbert Smith Freehills, have
put  forward a hypothesis of  what  could be the outcome of  this.  They are of  the
opinion that this approach is a violation of international law and treaties to which SA
is a party. Lawyers Peter Leon, Hannah Ambrose and Ernst Müller argue that such
an amendment would deter investors from SA.555 They cite the burdensome activity
of current foreign investors seeking alternative avenues under international law to
lessen any potential negative effect land expropriation without compensation might
have on their interests.556 
550 G Erasmus ‘Trump’s Trade War: Are the Brakes Failing?’ 27 June 2018. Available at 
https://www.tralac.org/blog/article/13196-trump-s-trade-war-are-the-brakes-failing.html, accessed om 
17 October 2018.
551 R Vollgraaff ‘South Africa: 'US confirms it’s not using AGOA as leverage over land expropriation’ 
5 September 2018. Available at https://agoa.info/news/article/15518-south-africa-us-confirms-it-s-not-
using-agoa-as-leverage-over-land-expropriation.html, accessed on 17 October 2018.
552 Ibid.
553 S Njobeni ‘Local union warns South Africa that AGOA eligibility under threat if land expropriation 
goes ahead’ 7 August 2018. Available at 
https://agoa.info/news/article/15499-local-union-warns-south-africa-that-agoa-eligibility-under-threat-
if-land-expropriation-goes-ahead.html, accessed on 17 October 2018.
554 54th ANC National Conference Report and Resolutions note 520.
555 Njobeni note 553.
556 Ibid.
62
4.6 Conclusion
The  importance  of  AGOA  is  not  to  be  overlooked  in  any  way,  as  the  above
discussion suggests. Thus far, considering the position of African countries, it has
been a fairly beneficial agreement for African countries although it can improve in
certain areas, particularly the unilateral nature of the Act. One of the reasons this Act
came into existence is because the US was looking to compete with the EU and the
position it held with regard to trade relations in Africa, in the form of EPAs and, as
mentioned above,  the  TDCA,  which  it  entered into  with  SA.  If  the  US wants  to
compete  with  the  EU,  it  needs  to  improve  or  establish  a  similar  or  even  better
relationship  and  trade  terms  with  African  countries.  The  future  of  AGOA  at  the
moment  is  uncertain  as  it  still  has  seven  years  to  run  and  there  have  been
suggestions of  a  transition  to  a  more  balanced and reciprocal  trade relationship
similar to that of the EU.557 
It would be in the best interests of the US to remain in the position that it currently
occupies because it is from there that it has wielded the most influence for centuries.
The saying  ‘power  corrupts,  but  absolute  power  corrupts  absolutely’558 comes to
mind  when  viewing  the  circumstances.  When  dealings  involving  the  US  are
examined closely,  one is  most  likely to find an irregular pattern which has gone
almost unquestioned for centuries. The US has been for an extended period of time
the biggest economy in the world owing to its ability to infiltrate many a nation and
exert its influence, often establishing a method of doing things, and entrenching it
deeply to such an extent that these countries end up adopting its way of life and
suggestions with their becoming the norm. Looking at historical events, Africa seems
to be caught in an endless cycle of reliance on its colonisers to be its saviour. By
now it should be clear that developed countries are merely continuing their agenda,
except that now it is no longer as blatant as it previously was.
The discussion on SA and the US has revealed a different side to the intentions of
the  US.  As  per  the  discussion,  it  is  clear  that  SA  still  going  to  be  face  ample
upheavals. As a side note, the actions of the US are based rather on political than
economic substance. Having provided this detailed discussion on AGOA, the US and
Africa,  with  particular  focus  on  SA,  the  final  chapter  will  provide  some
recommendations.
557 Ismail note 397 540.
558 Quote from historian and moralist Lord Acton, who expressed this opinion in a letter to Bishop 
Mandell Creighton in 1887.
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CHAPTER 5: 
RECOMMENDATIONS AND CONCLUSION
Even though we should forgive, we should never forget that…
US President Bill Clinton once said: 
‘The lines between our [US] domestic and foreign policies have increasingly 
disappeared – that we [US] must revitalize our economy if we [US] are to sustain
our military forces, foreign initiatives, and global influence, and that we must 
engage actively abroad if we are to open foreign markets and create jobs for our 
people.’559
5.1 Introduction
The main objective of this research was to discuss the extent to which the United
States of America (US) wields influence in Africa,  more particularly in respect  of
AGOA,  and the  extent  to  which  this  affects  African countries  that  enter  into  the
AGOA agreement,  with  particular  reference to  South Africa (SA).  This was done
through a discussion of topics such as to what extent development has been a factor
in the multilateral trading system, the history of the relations between the US and SA,
and a general overview of the operation of the AGOA in Africa and SA – especially
with regard to its reauthorisation. The inspiration for this study was the procedure
and outcome of the reauthorisation negotiations, which resulted in a ‘special out-of-
cycle review’ that saw SA remove anti-dumping (AD) duties that it had imposed on
poultry imports from the US at the inception of the Act.560 These factors prompted the
question as to when developing countries will  be able to emancipate themselves
from  the  remnants  of  colonial  rule?  This  could  help  developing  countries  to
determine their own future on their own terms. 
To put the matter into context, the study identified particular research questions that
assisted in determining the extent to which development has been a factor in trade-
related negotiations, with particular focus on the position of African countries that
form part  of  Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA).  Thus,  against  this  background,  this  final
chapter will first discuss the main findings of the relevant chapters and will thereafter
provide some recommendations.
559 Obua note 378 68. 
560 Chapter 4: The AGOA and the Overall Implications in Relation to African Countries, 14.
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5.2 Findings
The findings of the dissertation are revisited in this section chapter by chapter. This
section  will  state  the  findings  of  each  of  the  chapters  under  their  respective
headings.
5.2.1 Chapter 2
In this chapter the study focused on the origins of the GATT and the WTO with a
focus  on  the  extent  to  which  development  has  been  the  focus  of  developing
countries. As discussed above, development was a key concern of this study and
this chapter found that it has remained a topical issue for decades, ever since the
establishment of organisations that formulate strategies intended to resolve global
issues.  While reading for the chapter,  it  became clear that  in international  trade,
diplomacy  plays  a  significant  role,  as  it  provides  an  alternative  to  previously
unsuccessful approaches, such as war. Through diplomacy, all relevant stakeholders
can voice their concerns in a manner that is intended to place all parties on an equal
footing. However, this chapter also identified that the underlying fabric in forums that
host trade negotiations between developed and developing countries is economic,
political  and  generational  power,  which  dictates  at  which  end  of  the  totem pole
members tend to lie.561. 
The chapter further found that inequality in international trade relations has been
present for decades. This can be seen, for instance, through those countries which
are  usually  at  the  forefront  of  big  global  events.562 This  chapter  included  the
negotiation in relation to the creation of institutions, the ending of the World Wars
and the Great Depression, among others.563 The chapter also found that developed
countries wield influence that affects many of the world’s countries because of the
various interests within them. The chapter illustrated that it is from these positions
that  it  can  be  ‘established’  that  developed  countries  influence  proceedings
considerably. This chapter also highlighted that at times, developing countries would
form coalitions with developed countries, sometimes negotiating against their own
interests to garner possible reciprocal favour in the future and neglecting countries in
similar positions to themselves. 
Furthermore, the chapter found that with diplomacy having become the established
practice,  it  is  inevitable  that  developed  status  will  remain  among  a  select  few
developed countries, while developing countries will be hampered by the continuous
delays and the proverbial ‘shifting of goal posts’ as well as targets. What is of great
concern is that it became apparent that at this rate, developing countries will remain
561 Van Grasstek note 31 43.
562 Examples of these include the World Wars, negotiation of the International Trade Organisation 
(ITO), formation of the League of Nations and the subsequent UN.
563 Chapter 2 Development in The Multilateral Trading System, 1–2.
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on the back foot and on an unlevel playing field if proceedings involving trade and
negotiation, which indirectly affect development, remain as they are. These concerns
were proved when this chapter found that during the negotiation rounds of the GATT,
for  example,  the  number  of  rounds  that  took  place as  well  as  the  time periods
between  them  illustrated  what  a  lengthy  process  this  can  be.  Also,  the  issues
discussed are vast and vary across a wide spectrum of each country’s position which
often lengthens proceedings, although this is assisted by the formation of coalitions
and partnerships. As such, the tactics and strategies utilised by developed countries
are often based on the above-mentioned factors of economic and political power and
tip the scales in favour of those who wield this to a greater degree. All of this laid the
foundation for unequal standing, the leveraging of developing countries to the will of
the  developed  countries,  as  well  as  the  proliferation  of  least  developed  and
developing countries’ current economic position as the reauthorisation negotiations
for AGOA illustrated. Ultimately chapter 2 found that institutions such as the WTO
are  concerned  only  with  the  challenges  of  developed  countries  because  of  the
continued  struggle  developing  countries  have  in  implementing  the  policies
formulated towards their development.
5.2.2 Chapter 3
Chapter 3 provided an overview of the trade relationship between SA and the US
with focus on the dynamics in the trade relations between the countries during the
apartheid regime and how these dynamics affected the current position as well as
how the US adjusted to SA’s position after 1994. This was to show the pattern that
the  US has always operated in  the  way it  currently  does.  Therefore,  when they
present legislation such as AGOA, these should be viewed with a certain level of
scepticism.
Continuing  from  chapter  two,  chapter  three  discussed  a  regime  that  previously
thrived as a result of oppression and confirmed that similar patterns in trade have
emerged  throughout  history.  Again,  the  chapter  reaffirmed  that  apartheid  is  an
atrocious crime the role of which continued the trend of inequality responsible for the
success  and  progression  of  certain  select  groups.  The  apartheid  regime  was
supported by a wide variety of developed countries because of how it benefited their
economies. This chapter showed that countries that were participating in apartheid
trade relations  were  also  the  same countries  who eventually  supported  calls  for
sanctions, albeit after a substantial delay in taking this step, a step of which the US
formed a part. What was also found in this chapter is that the only way that effective
change can take place is through paradigm-shifting events. This is the opposite of
what  is  being  promoted  as  the  purpose  of  global  organisations  that  attempt  to
resolve the world’s issues. 
Interestingly, the chapter found that there were initiatives introduced at every turn by
developing countries that were billed as the answer to SA’s apartheid challenges, but
these did not result in the desired effect. For example, it took mass demonstration in
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the US through picketing by organisations564 where South African goods were to be
unloaded;565 sanctions  on  SA’s  products,  services  and  goods;566 and  absolute
necessity on the part of countries with economic interests in SA that were being
affected  negatively  by  sanctions  to  bring  to  a  halt  one  of  the  most  brutal  and
dehumanising  experiences  in  human  history.  The  chapter  found  that  apartheid
played a significant role in the position in which SA finds itself in today. It created a
system of separation that still has remnants and knock-on effects to this day. Like
the AGOA, the US states that it is for the benefit of SSA countries and its operation
is meant to effect change; but thus far it has done little, or not enough, of what it was
intended  to  do.  Of  much  greater  concern,  this  chapter  identified  that  economic
interests  and the  self-interest  of  a  select  few developed countries  end up being
prioritised, while developing countries such as SA and least  developed countries
which are part of AGOA must find a way to work around this after having put faith in
individuals who were expected to represent their interests.567 
This chapter recognises that trade is a piece of the overall puzzle as it is the basis
for the economic reality of most countries. Although developed countries might be in
much suitable positions due to the demand of the products and services they render,
this should not be an indicator of superiority that can be leveraged in their favour.
The chapter found that SA has most of its infrastructure, markets and institutions
because of the apartheid era, which is why it was for a long time the most developed
economy in  Africa.568 It  can  be  argued  that  being  leveraged  stems from foreign
interests which have considerable investments in SA, and have partially contributed
to the development of sectors which in turn further support their interests, and most
likely will  see them do all  they can in order not to lose or have them negatively
affected. This study found that such signs of this appeared as early as during the
Treatment Action Campaign (TAC) case.569 The study found further that it was only
resistance  during  the  Free  Trade  Agreement  (FTA)  negotiations  with  the  South
African Customs Union (SACU) countries voicing their concerns on various topics
which ultimately led to unsuccessful negotiations.570 Seemingly there is strength in
numbers when negotiating with a country considered to be a superpower. 
5.2.3 Chapter 4
Having laid the foundation for the discussion, chapter 4 sought to focus on aspects in
relation to AGOA in order to determine to what extent its influence has had on trade
relations  between  SA  and  the  US.  Ultimately,  the  research  sought  to  discuss
whether  trade  relations  between  SA  and  the  US  have  been  beneficial  towards
564 The American Committee on Africa (ACOA), the National Association for the Advancement of 
Coloured People (NAACP) and the Congress on Racial Equality (CORE).
565 Chapter 3: Overview of The Trade and Political Relations Between South Africa and The United 
States of America, 6.
566 Ibid. 5.
567 Mafu note 501 13.
568 Chapter 3 note 565 3.
569 Ibid. 13.
570 Ibid.
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development on the African continent through the implementation and operation of
the AGOA. The study identified issues that needed addressing to shift the position of
developing  African  countries,  which  will  be  discussed  below.  Inequality  in
international trade is still prevalent in the modern era and is still a huge factor that
contributes to perpetuating the existing status quo. The study found that although the
intention  may  often  be  altruistic,  the  implementation  and  results  thereof  can  be
disheartening, especially in terms of redress to prevent potential exploitation. This
study shows that impressive statistics are often reported, but a closer look shows
that equal standing is somewhat askew. As such, the study found that Institutions
and organisations such as the UN and WTO are intended to perform objectively but
sometimes, they also fall prey to the power of developed countries. This study found
that loopholes exist in international trade processes the world over, but these are
intentionally exploited instead of being addressed accordingly.571 For example, the
study highlighted that the US supported the SA apartheid regime but at the dawn of
democracy offered another form of subjugation which came in the form of aid to
show its supposed good will, which the study found was nothing but another tactic to
secure its own economic interests and further strengthen them. 
This study also found that features of the AGOA such as the eligibility requirement
should be unnecessary for participation in trade as it promotes exclusion from the
onset.572 This further grants powers to the US and enables it to dictate further the
course of  events which indirectly  causes division  among developing  countries  in
Africa.  This  continues the trend of  seeking approval  from previous colonisers for
matters that affect African countries. Eligibility that is determined by a foreign country
is an ominous exercise as it creates the opportunity to exploit developing African
countries with vast resources which are often coveted by developed countries. In
addition,  requiring  nations  with  different  needs  and  objectives  to  adhere  to  a
particular set of requirements contradicts the intention of assisting with development
because development should not be restricted to the extent in which it benefits only
one or a few parties.
The study further found that what AGOA seems to give with one hand it takes away
with the other, because not all countries involved in the agreement are able to attract
foreign  investment.573 Thus,  a  country  that  has  comparative  advantage  over  the
products and services of the US will attract peak tariffs in order to avoid disrupting
the important exports of the US.574 Furthermore, an importing country such as the
US, for example, would protect its manufacturing industries through lowering duties
on imports of raw materials, and higher duties on finished products.575 This would in
turn see fewer benefits for  the manufacturing country as in some instances,  this
could result in trade deficits.576 Additionally, there is no guarantee in benefits towards
571Chapter 3 note 565 4.
572 Chapter 4: The AGOA and the Overall Implications in Relation to African Countries, 6–7.
573 Ibid 11.
574 Ibid.
575 Ibid.
576 Ibid.
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workers and businesses that are a result of expanded trade. The US now also seeks
payment  from beneficiaries for  preferences under  the newly reauthorized AGOA,
which  removes the  position  of  accountability  for  perpetuating  colonial  rule  under
which the US had first entered the AGOA.
This study further found that the stance of the US that the AD duties imposed on it by
SA  were  not  in  line  with  the  eligibility  requirements  for  the  AGOA  enables  its
increased control in trade relations between these two countries.577 This is a result of
the new legislation which gives power to the United States Trade Representative
(USTR) to Act in the interest of lobby groups that can petition the President of the US
regarding concerns about an AGOA beneficiary entering into an agreement with a
third party that conflicts with the economic interests of these parties.578 This study
found  that  the  ability  to  create  such  mechanisms  gives  further  leverage  to  US
companies  and  organisations  with  interests  on  the  African  continent.579 It  also
creates  further  tension  as  opposed  to  harmonic  co-operation  regarding  trade
relations and serves as an indicator in which direction relations between Africa and
the US are headed. 
This chapter further found that the US is insistent on the negotiation of FTAs as it
has made provision for them in the reauthorised AGOA of 2015.580 The US has never
been  comfortable  with  the  idea  of  granting  preferences,  as  far  as  back  as
negotiations for the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) in 1947.581 The
reauthorised AGOA states that the first opportunity available to negotiate reciprocal
FTAs will be taken because of the progress made by the European Union (EU) with
regard to European Preference Agreements (EPAs) with African countries and sub-
regions.582 The US is also threatened by emerging markets, especially that of China,
and has instructed the USTR to oppose these specifically,  further  illustrating the
intention  of  maintaining  a  foothold  in  its  position  rather  than  contribute  to  the
development of lesser countries. 
The study ultimately found that AGOA is a contradictory piece of legislation the fabric
of which is arbitrary towards African countries.583 This is illustrated by the existence
of inequality in the trade relationship between the US, SA and African states as a
whole because of historical events that have shaped these countries. The interests
of the US are at the forefront of its operations and any other agenda comes second
to  this  This  was  illustrated  in  the  way  in  which  it  conducted  itself  during  the
reauthorisation negotiations with SA. The AGOA does not assist African participants
with  development  but  instead  increases  how it  can  better  position  itself  prior  to
assisting  with  development.  Ultimately,  the chapter  found that  the US intends to
577 Chapter 4 note 572 17.
578 Ismail note 397 539.
579 Ibid. 534.
580 Chapter 4 note 572 12.
581 Ismail note 397 539.
582 Chapter 4 note 572 14.
583 Ibid. 11.
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increase the strength of its position further as it sees other leading countries in a
more suitable position than itself. 
5.3 Recommendations 
Although the intentions of developed countries are portrayed as being altruistic and
beneficial towards developing countries, the evidence at times suggests the contrary.
Reports  of  increased  revenue,  growth  in  various  industries  and  employment
opportunities indicate positive progress, but the cost seems to be the marginalisation
of a country’s sovereignty.584 Unilateral trade agreements to a certain extent limit this
because their nature is such that the provider of benefits tends to determine the way
in which they operate. For instance, AGOA members must adhere to the provisions
of  the Act  without  question or query and have no remedy available if  the Act  is
arbitrary  towards  them.  Furthermore,  its  presentation  is  misconstrued  as  its
operation is contrary to the provisions on these aspects. This seemingly continues
the status quo even though it is in a somewhat subtle manner. Therefore, questions
such as: ‘How can development be to the satisfaction of only one party when there
are multiple stakeholders involved?’ and ‘How do developing countries such as SA
emancipate themselves from the circumstances under which they find themselves?’
arise. This section suggests/presents recommendations which could address these
problems, identified in the research.
5.3.1 A new development strategy
Thus far there have been incremental  steps taken to ensure that the position of
dependency of developing countries on developed countries changes as academics
and  authors  have  put  forward  their  own  suggestions.585 What  is  key  is  that
development should be constantly, relentlessly and continually pursued, albeit under
circumstances more suitable for the development of African countries, especially for
developing countries. Development begins from the bottom up with individuals and
not  from  the  top  of  institutions  downwards.  An  alternative  approach  could  be
beneficial in this case because it is often simpler (in relation to the task) and more
effective  to  convince  smaller  groups  of  institutions  such  as  regional  and  local
governments and communities of developing countries to pursue a certain path than
it would be to attempt to influence millions of people at once. In lieu of this, the study
recommends  that  Institutions  such  as  the  WTO  should  consider  empowering
communities  through  targeted  initiatives  that  address  shortcomings  in  relation  to
trade as a start to effecting change on a larger scale. This approach will therefore
influence African governments via individuals and communities as opposed to having
states being influenced by developed countries and having to implement policies and
legislation  based  on  such  influence.  What  should  be  the  ideal  circumstance  is
objective and balanced trade where challenges and benefits are treated alike, which
has not been the norm thus far. 
584 Ibid.
585 Ngang note 167; Lehloenya & Mpya note 191.
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5.3.2 Role of stakeholders along with the private and public sectors
As identified in the chapters, stakeholders such as corporations are central to the
process that involves trade relations as they produce and manufacture the goods
and services that are bartered with other countries. Most would have to alter the way
they  operate  for  a  more  strongly  all-encompassing and beneficial  outcome,  with
businesses in the private sector shifting from the sole purpose of making profit and
moving  towards  incorporating  reinvestment  and  community  building  initiatives.  In
recent  times  corporate  social  responsibility/investment  (CSR/I)  has  become
fundamental for businesses as this is how they measure their socio-economic impact
on communities.586. This requires SA’s businesses to dedicate a certain portion of
their operations and profits to ‘giving back’ to communities through initiatives that are
beneficial  and  would  be  self-sustainable  long  after  the  business  is  no  longer
involved. Reinvestment in communities should be a crucial requirement in gauging
how effective  trade  operations  are  on  a  larger  scale.  This  effectiveness  can  be
monitored through periodic or continuous assessments to measure progress by a
new institution that will  deal directly with reinvestment. Reinvestment should be a
requirement between trading countries, especially if it is between a developed and a
developing country. Developed countries should reinvest a portion of their profits in
improving the industry in which they are trading with developing countries to get it to
a world-class standard or one like that of a developed country.
Where targets are not  met or  irregular  conduct  involving underhand proceedings
takes  place  between  countries  and  communities,  sanctions  and  fines  should  be
issued to transgressors. This would be conducted through the WTO’s committee on
budget,  finance  and  administration  together  with  the  Committee  on  Trade  and
Development.587 These institutions would be dealing with  reinvestment,  where all
corporations  and  countries  involved  in  trade  are  required  to  pledge  a  certain
percentage of their profits back into communities. Where reinvestment takes place
will  be  determined  by  the  institution  through  research  and  statistics,  but  most
importantly  will  consult  communities  at  grass  roots-level  about  their  needs.  The
institutions will function as a link between communities, countries and the WTO and
will  need all  stakeholders to co-operate.  This will  aim to help developing African
countries to have a mandate to follow that relates to them directly when negotiating
trade. Deviating from it will mean deviating from development. 
586 MdH Kabir, J Mukuddem-Petersen, MA Petersen ‘Corporate social responsibility evolution in South
Africa’ (2015) 13(4) Problems and Perspectives in Management’ 281.
587 Committee on Budget, Financing and Administration. Available at 
https://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/cbfa_e/cbfa_e.htm, accessed on 24 February 2019.
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Essentially, this recommendation involves many aspects because of the nature of
how development is defined. Its all-encompassing nature needs ancillary support
from other fields for it to be truly effective. Deterrents to this could be the size and
scale  at  which  implementation  could  take  place.  This  could  be  overcome  by
delegating duties to branches of the WTO institutions that will deal specifically with
challenges that arise and will form part of the CTD and committee on budget, finance
and administration’s structures. African government departments along with regional
institutions that  are relevant to an area/region or to the extent  that functions are
relevant  to  an  area  will  interact  with  the  WTO  institutions  and  aim  at  making
operations as seamless as possible. Another challenge under the current reality is
that negotiating for such changes to take effect can seem like an endless cycle that
sees a return to bureaucracy, which can result  in further delays in implementing
impactful and potentially life-changing methods. This will regulate the approach of
developed countries such as the US to focus not only on their own benefit but also to
factor in their developing country trade partners.
5.3.3 Addressing the deficiencies in AGOA
There  are  ample  concerns  regarding  AGOA.  First,  the  research  identified,  as
mentioned above, that what is lacking in AGOA is a Dispute Resolution Mechanism.
Thus, the study recommends its creation and operation, which would ensure that
countries are not left  without the opportunity to challenge overbearing and unjust
conduct. It could help to avoid leaving countries in a stagnant or worse-off position
than  they  had  been  in  prior  to  entering  into  the  agreement.  The  WTO  already
provides for this mechanism, but the nature of the AGOA is that the President of the
US is the ‘commander in chief’ along with petitioners in the form of US lobby groups
and  business  interests  which  form  the  chain  of  command.588 It  seems  with  the
reauthorisation that this will remain intact until the expiration of this Act. If the US is
willing to put mechanisms in place such as biennial trade reviews and monitor them
to an extent that ensures its interests are met, it can also make provision which will
in  turn  ensure  that  this  takes  place  in  a  constructive  manner  which  benefits
participating countries. Perhaps the overall aim of trade relations and all forms of
interaction with  other countries should be human advancement and benefit  on a
larger scale as the barometer for whether the outcome is successful. This aspect
seems not even to have come up in the discussions at all, while these provisions
have been described as the underlying aim in order to achieve human advancement
and meaningful benefit to developing countries.
It has also been mooted that the creation of reciprocal terms can be the solution to
alleviate  some  of  the  challenges  that  developing  countries  face.  However,  this
approach is impractical as not all African countries are at the stage where they can
reciprocate, and they are dependent on these ‘special terms’ that allow them ample
leeway. Most of these suggestions come from the US, which is seeking to fulfil its
588 Chapter 4 note 572 5.
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own economic ambitions by keeping up with the EU and China. A compromise can
be found to negotiate FTAs with countries who feel this would be more suited to their
position and needs. There was an instruction to USTR Ambassador Froman by the
US Congress as recently as 2016 to compile such a list of countries, but the dark
cloud  of  the  unsuccessful  negotiations  with  SACU  in  2003  hang  over  this
conversation whenever it is raised.589 The argument of the EU having been able to
implement FTAs with African countries is a solid argument on the part of the US and
could stand it in good stead when revisiting this issue.590
5.3.4 Role of regional agendas 
As identified in chapter 2, an agenda which seems to be taking responsibility for its
own initiatives and future is that of Agenda 2063. African countries can use this as a
benchmark when engaging in trade with countries such as the US. The intention of
conducting  trade  with  the  US or  any  developed  country  should  be  towards  the
achievement  of  the  aims  outlined  by  Agenda  2063.  Identification  of  pertinent
challenges will  go a long way to assist  in addressing them, which Agenda 2063
does. This comes in the form of consideration of the development dynamics which
are in relation to Africa those that involve social and human development. In order to
achieve its targets, the agenda includes the premise that understanding the history
and  current  challenges  of  Africa  is  crucial  to  achieving  its  goals.  Agenda  2063
recognises education as a component of  this end goal,  having identified the low
enrolment rates in all three levels of schooling from primary, secondary to tertiary as
being  at  17.8 percent,  44.1  percent  and  7.7  percent  respectively  in  2011.591
Education indeed needs accelerated attention as the majority of the population on
the African continent is young people. The agenda does a stellar job of identifying
the detailed challenges and opportunities that can address the various aspects in
which Africa can improve. Strategies to ensure that goals are achieved are the 10-
year perspective plans that ‘place emphasis on accelerating the implementation of
key continental frameworks as’ well as fast tracking the integration agenda.592 These
are  the  benchmark  and  standards  against  which  negotiations  with  developed
countries such as the US should be held. If they do not result in solutions that aim to
achieve these objectives, then they should be deemed ineffective.
589 Ismail note 397 541.
590 Chapter 4 note 572 14.
591 The African Union Commission (AUC): Agenda 2063 note 148 24.
592 Ibid. 53.
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5.4 Conclusion
The conclusions reached on this topic are drawn from the initial research question of
the extent to which development has been the focus on trade relations between SA
and the US in terms of AGOA. The research undertaken in this dissertation has
served to illustrate that there has not been very much focus on development in terms
of this Act, with the common thread revealing that it is mostly self-interest that drives
the US. On the other hand, there is a renaissance taking place in Africa which is
incrementally influencing the perception that Africans have of themselves. There is a
sense of pride in being African and this is shown through initiatives such as Agenda
2063, which aims to build Africa in an image that portrays itself as the potentially
wealth-laden continent which it is.
The past  trade relations between SA and the US can be the foundation for  the
direction which determines the future of a country. What can be said about Africa is
that regardless of all the adversity it has faced and continues to face, it seems to
keep rising continuously. This indicates the immense potential of things to come as
we further develop and realise that we need one another more than before. As a
continent we can certainly achieve more. With the continued forces such as the US
that seem to prefer keeping Africa in the position it previously was and is in, it is
seemingly a matter of time that true intentions come to light in African countries. This
should not deter Africans and its partners from working towards the realisation that
we are what we need. 
With that said, every cloud has a silver lining and it is hoped that as we progress and
evolve further in every aspect, the dignity and development of countries who are in
need of it should take centre stage as the most important consideration, as opposed
to putting economy and power at the forefront and as the crux of every underlying
motivation between countries.  Understandably,  development in  most  places does
take place over a lengthy period. There are signs of improvement present on paper
but  much of  it  is  not materially and physically manifested for Africa’s developing
countries.
This dissertation has been about how development is centred on trade relations and
this study has illustrated that there is a lack of it through the relationship between the
US and SA, with particular focus being on AGOA.
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ANNEXURE ONE: COUNTRIES FORMING PART OF THE ACP
Africa
CEMAC plus São Tomé and Príncipe, DR Congo group (ECCAS related)
 Cameroon
 Central African Republic
 Chad
 Democratic Republic of the Congo
 Republic of the Congo
 Equatorial Guinea
 Gabon
 São Tomé and Príncipe
EAC Group
 Burundi
 Kenya
 Rwanda
 Tanzania
 Uganda
Eastern and Southern Africa Group (COMESA related)
 Comoros
 Djibouti
 Eritrea
 Ethiopia
 Madagascar
 Malawi
 Mauritius
 Seychelles
 Somalia
 Sudan
 Zambia
 Zimbabwe
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SADC Group
 Angola
 Botswana
 Lesotho
 Mozambique
 Namibia
 South Africa
 Swaziland
West Africa Group (ECOWAS plus Mauritania)
 Benin
 Burkina Faso
 Cabo Verde
 Côte d'Ivoire
 Gambia
 Ghana
 Guinea
 Guinea-Bissau
 Liberia
 Mali
 Mauritania
 Niger
 Nigeria
 Senegal
 Sierra Leone
 Togo
Caribbean
 Antigua and Barbuda
 Bahamas
 Barbados
 Belize
 Cuba
 Dominica
 Dominican Republic
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 Grenada
 Guyana
 Haiti
 Jamaica
 Saint Kitts and Nevis
 Saint Lucia
 Saint Vincent and the Grenadines
 Suriname
 Trinidad and Tobago
Pacific
 Fiji
 Cook Islands
 Kiribati
 Marshall Islands
 Federal States of Micronesia
 Nauru
 Niue
 Palau
 Papua New Guinea
 Samoa
 Solomon Islands
 Timor-Leste
 Tonga
 Tuvalu
 Vanuatu
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